










































The authenticity of the document at Demosth. 24.20-3, the
procedures of nomothesia and the so-called   
Citation for published version:
Canevaro, M 2018, 'The authenticity of the document at Demosth. 24.20-3, the procedures of nomothesia
and the so-called   ', Klio, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 70-124. https://doi.org/10.1515/klio-2018-0003
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1515/klio-2018-0003
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




This is the final version of the following article: Canevaro, M. (2018). The Authenticity of the Document at
Demosth. or. 24.20–3, the Procedures of nomothesia and the so-called   . Klio, 100(1), pp. 70-124, which has
been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1515/klio-2018-0003.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. Sep. 2019
Mirko Canevaro*
The Authenticity of the Document at
Demosth. or. 24.20–3, the Procedures of
nomothesia and the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία
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Summary: This article is a response to Hansenʼs recent defence of the authenticity
of the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3. It discusses the methodology for as-
sessing the authenticity of the documents in the orators, in particular the role(s)
of the stichometry and the importance of the epigraphic evidence. It provides an
in-depth analysis of the evidence about the nomothesia procedure provided in
Demosthenesʼ „Against Timocrates“, showing, first, that this procedure was one
centred on the enactment of new laws, and not, as the document describes, a
general review of the laws of Athens; second, that the procedure described in the
speech is one that can be initiated at all points of the year (consistently with what
the epigraphic evidence shows), whereas the document describes an annual
procedure taking place only on the 11th day of the first prytany; third, that the
procedure described in the speech was initiated by a simple διαχειροτονία that
allowed new proposals to be made, whereas the document describes multiple
initial votes „kapitelweise“ to be held in the Assembly on different groups of
existing laws. The last part of the article surveys eight specific problems with the
text of the document, which confirm that it cannot be an authentic Athenian law.
Keywords: nomothesia, forgeries, Athenian law, DemosthenesʼAgainst
Timocrates“
1. Introduction
In 2013, I proposed a new approach to the sources for nomothesia discussed in
Demosth. or. 24 and 20 and a new interpretation of the relevant procedures.1 My
contentionwas that existing interpretations fail tomake sense of all the evidence,
*Kontakt: Mirko Canevaro, E-Mail: The University of Edinburgh, mirko.canevaro@ed.ac.uk
1 Canevaro 2013a; 2013b, 80–104.
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and in particular of the extensive evidence found in Demosthenesʼ paraphrases of
the relevant laws, supplemented by the epigraphic material. I argued that the
reason for these difficulties is the uncritical reliance of historians on the infor-
mation found in the documents found at Demosth. or. 24.20–3 and 33, which
contradicts the rest of the evidence and that has led to untenable reconstructions
of the procedures of nomothesia. In my treatment, I noted that these documents
are non-stichometric, which indicates that they are later additions to the tradition
of the speech, and have no original claim to authenticity – their tradition is not
coterminous with that of the speech itself, and their authenticity cannot be
predicated on that of the speech.2 I explored the contradictions between doc-
uments and independent information, examined in detail the documents them-
selves finding several problems in their wording and expressions and in the logic
of their provisions, and showed that they are later forgeries and are an unreliable
source for reconstructing Athenian nomothesia. As a result, I proposed a new
reconstruction of the fourth-century nomothesia procedures that did not involve
an annual review of all the laws, and allowed instead for the enactment of new
laws at all points of the year. The procedure, in my reconstruction, ran as follows:
1) in order to introduce a new law, a preliminary vote in theAssembly, at any point
of the year, had to be held that would allow new laws to be proposed; this vote,
like all votes in the Assembly, had to be preceded by a probouleuma of the
Council; 2) once new proposals had been authorized by the Assembly, all new
proposals had to be posted in front of themonument of the EponymousHeroes, so
that anybody could see them; 3) the bills had to be read out by the secretary in
each Assembly until the appointment of the nomothetai; 4) in the third Assembly
after the preliminary vote, on the basis of the bills presented, the people had to
discuss the appointment of nomothetai and pass a decree of appointment; 5)
opposing laws had to be repealed before the new laws could be enacted by the
nomothetai; 6) presumably at the same meeting of the Assembly that appointed
the nomothetai, expert synegoroi were elected to defend those laws whose repeal
was necessary for enacting the new laws; 7) if the proposer of a new law failed to
abide by any of these provisions, anyone could prosecute him on a charge of
enacting an unsuitable law (me epitedeion), and if the case was heard within a
year from the enactment of the law, the punishment could be anything the court
decided, from a small fine to atimia or death.
In a characteristically kind yet belligerent article of 2016, M. H. Hansen at-
tempts to defend his interpretation of the nomothesia procedures, based primarily
on these documents, and challenges most of the grounds of my case against the
2 Canevaro 2013b, 19–23.
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document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3.3 First, he takes issue with one of the tenets of
my methodology – the need for the document to conform to the language and
formulas of Athenian inscriptions. Second, he offers a reading of the paraphrases
at Demosth. or. 24.17–19 and 24–6 of the law on nomothesia that attempts to show
that the procedure they describe is not incompatible with that described in the
document. Third, he argues that the problematic features I identified in the doc-
ument itself are not in fact problematic, and when they are, the problems do not
prove that the document is not authentic.
Hansenʼs case is unconvincing on all counts, but working out why exactly his
arguments are not convincing has forcedme to deepenmy readings of the sources
andmy understanding of the procedure, as well as to clarify some elements of the
methodology I used inmy original analysis. I thank him therefore for his attention
to my work and for the opportunity to return to this issue and offer this counter-
discussion, in a collaborative spirit, as one further step towards a better historical
understanding of Athenian lawmaking. My response follows the structure of
Hansenʼs article: first, I present some methodological considerations (section 2);
second, I discuss the paraphrase and the kind of procedure it describes (section
3); third, I turn to the problems with the document itself. Because of the structure
of this article, composed as a response to Hansenʼs, this discussion does not re-
place my original treatment (Canevaro 2013a), where my reconstruction of the
procedure is comprehensively laid out. It should rather be read in conjunction
with my previous article (and, of course, with Hansenʼs response), as an analysis
that strengthens several parts of my original case.
2. Documents, paraphrases and inscriptions:
methodological considerations
In my work I have applied a consistent methodology to assess whether a docu-
ment is likely to be authentic or not.4 The aim of the methodology is not to prove
that a document is a forgery, nor is it to prove that a document is authentic. It is a
3 Hansen 2016.
4 Canevaro 2013b, 10–36; Canevaro – Harris 2012, 98–100. For endorsements of my method and
my analysis see Cobetto Ghiggia 2013; DeMartinis 2013; Mirhady 2014; Novotny 2014; Vlassopou-
los 2014; Bearzot 2015; Liddel 2015; Pinto 2015; Gagarin 2016; Scafuro 2016 (with some objections
on points of detail); Sickinger 2016. See also Carawan 2016, which relies onmy assessment of the
documents of Demosth. or. 23 and 24, Mikalson 2016, 267 n. 1 and Faraguna 2016, which endorse
my method and apply it to other documents.
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method to assess the likelihood that a document may be authentic or not au-
thentic whose aim is not to prejudge the analysis with any kind of inherent bias.
The application of the method has led me in many cases to indicate that a docu-
ment is highly likely to be authentic, in many others that it is highly likely not to
be, and in some cases that the analysis per se cannot decide the issue (I shall
return to these cases). With ‚authentic‘ I mean that a document is a faithful
transcription of the actual Athenian original (and this is the sense in which
Hansen also uses the word), and can therefore be used as reliable, direct evidence
for Athenian laws and procedures.5 With ‚not authentic‘ I mean that a document
is not the transcription of an actual Athenian law or decree (whether complete or
partial), but rather a later fabrication. Such fabrications are ‚forgeries‘ sensu lato,
because there is no clear evidence of an intent to deceive: they are late and (more
or less) clumsy attempts to reconstruct the actual law or decree, based on the
(often misunderstood) evidence of the orators and occasionally on further inde-
pendent sources lost to us. These ‚reconstructions‘ are not actual Athenian laws
and decrees, and those that produced them in most instances recurred to inven-
tion and to an indiscriminate use of the evidence available to them, so that the
documents are not reliable evidence for the Athenian laws and decrees they
purport to reconstruct.6
5 See the very title of Hansen 2016, and passim.
6 See Canevaro 2013b, 35–36 and 329–342. Hansen argues that the document discussed in this
article, as well as the decrees of Teisamenus and Patrocleides in And. 1, are actually authentic
Athenian laws and decrees. Sommersteinʼs approach varies: while he is convinced (Sommerstein
2014) that the decree of Demophantus at And. 1.95–98 is a transcription of the actual decree (but
see now Harris 2015 which supplements Canevaro – Harris 2012 in showing that it is not), he
agreeswithme (Canevaro 2013b, 173–180) that theHeliastic Oath at Demosth or. 24.149–151 is not
the actual oath as itwas pronounced at any point, but rather a late reconstruction (Sommerstein–
Bayliss 2012, 70–80), arguing however for the reliability of specific provisions that the compiler
would have found in some source lost to us. Carawan (forthcoming), although he presents his
approach as a middle ground between my position and Hansenʼs, is in fact adamant that the
documents in And. 1 are not transcriptions of actual Athenian decrees, but rather pastiches of
information found in various places put together for the purpose of reconstructing the decrees.
Carawan proceeds to speculate on the way the documents were composed, a worthy enterprise,
but the bottom line is that these documents are not ‚authentic‘, and therefore cannot be taken at
face value as evidence for Athenian laws and decrees, but are later ‚reconstructions‘, ‚pastiches‘
marred by problems andmisunderstandings. Shearʼs (2017, 174–175 n. 52) approach is somewhat
muddled: she seems to agree that the documents (specifically in Andocides) are not transcrip-
tions of actual laws of decrees, but contends that „ancient quotation practices were [not] identi-
cal to the modern practice of exact quotation.“ She seems to be claiming therefore that the laws
read out by the grammateus in the Athenian lawcourts were not in fact accurate quotations of the
actual laws of Athens – hence, somehow, the documents are authentic despite being inaccurate
in language and contents. She proposes to prove this by pointing to Polluxʼs quotation practices,
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Mymethod relies mainly on an examination of the language and the contents
of each document (and of the external evidence about the relevant laws and
decrees) according to three methodological principles: 1) the documents must be
compared with the oratorsʼ paraphrases and comments, which are normally re-
liable in representing the contents of the relevant law or decree (if not in inter-
preting them), in particular when these comments are found in the vicinity of the
reading of the law or decree; theymust also be comparedwith external evidence.7
2) Problems in the texts of the documents cannot a priori be removed by means of
transpositions, emendations, and deletions– scribal errors are of course possible,
but should be postulated only if the document can be proven to be authentic on
other grounds. Such problems are prima facie grounds against authenticity.8 3)
„Documents should conform to the language, style and conventions of Classical
Athenian inscriptions of the same type […] The presence in a document of words
or expressions never found in similar Attic inscriptions, or in any Attic inscription
at all, casts serious doubts on the documentʼs authenticity.“9
as though a second century CE grammarian could tell us anything about how the laws were
quoted by the grammateus in Athenian lawcourts ca. five centuries earlier. She also points to
the differences between the version of the honours for Lycurgus found in in IG II2 457 and that
quoted in [Plut.] Mor. 851F–852. The text at [Plut.] Mor. 851F–852 appears to come from Lycoph-
ronʼs request to inherit the sitesis granted in Lycurgusʼ honours, as a copy of the decree produced
by Lycophoron and added to the dossier (see Faraguna 2003, 487–491). But, first, the two texts
are similar enough that the inscription has in fact been restored on the basis of [Plut.] Mor. 851F–
852; second, both versions are written in impeccable Attic official language (on which see below,
pp. 78–81); third, although the text of [Plut.] Mor. 851F–852 has one additional clause and lacks
several, there are no inconsistencies between the two documents, and where they overlap the
overlap is mostly verbatim. [Plut.] Mor. 851F–852 is evidence of selective quotation from an ori-
ginal, which is common also in the orators (Canevaro 2013b, 27–32), but of exact quotation ne-
vertheless, unlike the documents I challenge. Ultimately, quotation practices were context de-
pendent and were defined by institutional rules and practices. I have explored the relevant in-
stitutional rules and practices of the Athenian lawcourts in Canevaro 2013b, 27–32 (particularly n.
63) and shown that all the evidence points to conscientious and relatively ‘exactʼ quotation
practices, particularly for documents read by the grammateus but also (with less precision as
to wording) in the oratorsʼ own quotes.
7 Canevaro 2013b, 27–34.
8 Hansen 2016, 441–442 agrees that this principle is sound, but his exposition of it is not quite
accurate: „Major problems with the text of a document cannot be explained as scribal errors.
Theymust be mistakes made by someone who composed the document after the Classical period
and did not understand Athenian law and legal procedure.“ The point is not that they cannot be
scribal errors andmust bemistakesmade by forgers; it is rather that, fromamethodological point
of view, they cannot be assumed to be scribal errors, and explained away as such. They must be
part of the general case for or against authenticity, although theymay not be decisive evidence in
either direction.
9 Canevaro 2013b, 34–35.
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In addition to these methodological principles, my analysis takes into ac-
count the evidence of the stichometry.10 The stichometry plays a role in my
analysis on two levels, a basic level and a second-order level. At a basic level, the
stichometry allows us to tell whether a document was part of the speech from the
beginning, already in the „Urexemplar“, or was added at a later stage of the tra-
dition of the speech. It does not tell us, I must emphasise, whether a document is
authentic or not. But it does divide the extant documents sharply into two cate-
gories: documents that were there from the beginning, and documents that were
added much later (incidentally, these documents tend to appear only in part of
the manuscript tradition)11. It is not impossible that a document added at a later
datemay have been found somewhere and still be reliable, but the possibility that
it may be non-authentic is certainly there, and this is compounded by the fact that
even the most fervent believer in the authenticity of the documents must admit
that a significant number of non-stichometric documents are in fact forgeries:
nobody doubts that all the documents in Demosth or. 18 are forgeries.12 Thus,
stichometry does not allow us to decide that non-stichometric documents are
forgeries – only the analysis of their language and contents can! But it does
eliminate any presumption of authenticity – there is no a priori reason whatso-
ever to assume that non-stichometric documents should be authentic (and there
are reasons to be sceptical). And this is why it comes at the beginning ofmy study:
it proves that the usual approach of historians who assume that these documents
must be authentic unless proven otherwise is misguided, and that there is no
intrinsic reason for which these documents should be trusted.13 This is a point
that is not adequately taken into consideration inHansenʼs analysis, and ignoring
it determines the structure of his analysis and, ultimately, his results. But before
discussing this problem of Hansenʼs analysis, I need to turn to the secondary
function of stichometry in my work, one that is entirely separate from this basic
use and does not in any way affect the analysis of the document at Demosth. or.
24.20–3.
10 Canevaro 2013b, 10–26.
11 Canevaro 2013b, 7–10.
12 See for an analysis of all these documents Canevaro 2013b, 237–342.
13 This is why, incidentally, the criticism of Maffi 2012, and the cautioning of Bearzot 2015 and
Scafuro 2016 about my use of the stichometry are off the mark. It is not a fully accurate descrip-
tion of mymethod to state: „La presenza o meno nellʼUrexemplar costituisce il criterio principale
per la discussione dellʼautenticità.“My analysis of the individual documents is entirely indepen-
dent from their presence in the „Urexemplar“; it is only in the few cases in which the analysis is
inconclusive that I use the stichometry as a rough indication of whether it is more likely that a
document is authentic or not, see below.
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In the particular case of Demosth. or. 24, the stichometry plays also a second-
order role in my analysis. My book analysed 49 documents. 15 of these were
definitely part of the „Urexemplar“, whereas 29 were definitely not part of it. For 5
documents in Demosth or. 24 it is impossible to tell (Demosth or. 24.50, 54, 56, 59,
63). Of the 15 stichometric documents, my analysis concludes that 10 of them,
based on the analysis of their language, contents and external evidence, have a
high likelihood of being authentic, whereas the analysis is inconclusive in one
direction or the other in 5 cases. Of the 29 non-stichometric documents, my
analysis shows that 27 are very likely to be forgeries, whereas in two cases it is
difficult to tell. The overall analysis, therefore, shows that the majority of stich-
ometric documents is arguably authentic, and that the vast majority of non-
stichometric documents is arguably not. From this very simple fact, I infer the
rather common-sense observation that stichometric documents are absolutely
more likely to be authentic, and non-stichometric ones are absolutely more likely
to be forgeries. This inference does not represent an infallible law, but allows us to
formulate an educated guess on the authenticity where the regular analysis fails
to provide a clear result – of the 7 cases inwhich the analysis is inconclusive, the 5
stichometric documents have a higher chance of being authentic, and the 2 non-
stichometric ones have a higher chance of being inauthentic. Likewise, in the 5
instances in which we cannot tell whether a document is stichometric or not,
where the analysis points towards authenticity, the chances that this is a stich-
ometric document are higher, whereaswhere it points towards inauthenticity, the
chances that it is non-stichometric are higher. But I must emphasise that this
second-order use of stichometry does not replace or determine the analysis of the
documents, because it comes into play only after the analysis, and when the
analysis proves inconclusive. And this is not the case, as far as I am concerned, for
the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3: the verdict of inauthenticity does not de-
pend on the stichometry, but on the analysis of the document vis-à-vis the para-
phrase and the external evidence.14
Hansen agrees broadly with my first two methodological points for the anal-
ysis of the documents: that the text should not be „emended into authenticity“,
and that the paraphrases are normally reliable in the information they provide
(although they sometimes interpret it deceptively), but fails to draw the conse-
quences of these points once they are combined with what the stichometry shows
at the „basic level“ – that there is no presumption of authenticity for the non-
stichometric documents. If all this is broadly correct (and Hansen seems to agree
14 Hansen 2016, 474 concludes his analysis by promising a further study which will discuss also
the issue of stichometry and authenticity. I hope these two paragraphs will go some way towards
clarifyingmy use of the stichometry, and prevent misunderstandings such as those inMaffi 2012.
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that it is) then there are key consequences from a methodological and logical
point of view. Because there is an a priori presumption that the paraphrases are
normally reliable but no presumption whatsoever that the non-stichometric
documents are authentic, then the only sensible way to assess the reliability of a
document must be to start from the paraphrases (tested against further external
evidence), and not from the document itself. One should reconstruct the relevant
laws, decrees and procedures on the basis of the paraphrases (tested against
further external evidence) and independently of the document, and then test the
document against the result of that investigation. This approach, of course,
privileges the paraphrases (checked against independent evidence), stresses the
importance of inconsistencies between paraphrases and documents, and under-
plays the importance of broad similarities – after all, forgers had access to the
paraphrases when they composed their documents.15
Although he agrees with my assessment of the paraphrases, Hansen laments
that „in Canevaroʼs book too, whenever the oratorʼs paraphrase is inconsistent
with the document, the a priori view is: trust the paraphrase and reject the doc-
ument as a forgery“.16 With some nuances, this is correct, and it could not be
otherwise: the paraphrases are contemporary to the relevant laws, have a
straightforward and clear textual tradition, are in the vicinity of readings of the
actual laws and decrees, need to be broadly accurate (otherwise they would
alienate the judges), and there is evidence that they normally are (as I have ar-
gued, and as Hansen agrees).17 The non-stichometric documents, on the other
hand, are much later insertions in the speeches, have a mysterious tradition and
origins that are very hard for us to reconstruct, and are often clearly forgeries (see
those in Demosth. or. 18).18 It is the documents that we are testing, and it is in-
evitable that the generally reliable evidence found in the orators should have
logical and methodological priority in our analysis. The alternative – the method
used by Hansen in his analysis – is to start with the document, to reconstruct the
law or decree (in this case the procedure of nomothesia) on the basis of the doc-
ument, and then to use that reconstruction as a check for his reading of the
paraphrase – once he has derived his reconstruction from the document, Hansen
looks for broad similarities between this and the paraphrase, without realizing
15 One should also note that the assumption that forgers would naturally stick to the paraphra-
ses is demonstrably false – it is sufficient to look at the forged documents of Demosth. or. 18,
which are often largely independent of the paraphrases, see Canevaro 2013b, 237–318.
16 Hansen 2016, 442.
17 See Canevaro 2013b, 27–33 and Hansen 2016, 442.
18 Canevaro 2013b, 7–26, 237–318.
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that these prove nothing.19He then goes through the paraphrase with the explicit
purpose of showing that it is possible to read it in such a way that may be re-
conciled with the reconstruction he has derived from the document. I disagree
with his analysis and will show in the remainder of the article that, in order to do
this, Hansen stretches the meaning of the text beyond recognition, and many of
his readings of the relevant texts are impossible. But quite apart from this, this
method makes Hansenʼs analysis structurally biased. It is not a critical assess-
ment of the document, but rather a defence that ultimately does nothing more
than attempting to argue (unconvincingly) that the document may be authentic,
but provides no positive arguments in support of the thesis that it is authentic.
2.1 The documents and the language of inscriptions
The one methodological point that Hansen finds fully inadequate is the third: that
„documents should conform to the language, style and conventions of Classical
Athenian inscriptions of the same type“.20Hansenbelieves that „to insist onhaving
parallels incontemporaryAttic inscriptionsor inanyAttic inscription isadangerous
method to use in this case, because the epigraphic evidence at our disposal is both
restricted andbiased“. Hepoints out thatwehave virtually no „constitutional“ laws
preserved in inscriptions that would provide relevant parallels for our document,
and thenprovidesa list of technical legal termsattested in theoratorsbutunattested
in inscriptions. I am afraid, however, that his discussion here is a strawman argu-
ment, whichmisrepresentsmymethod asmuch cruder than it actually is.
First of all, although there is no doubt that the epigraphic sample is still
„restricted“ in comparison with the actual epigraphic output of the city, in ab-
solute terms the evidence is extensive – Lambert counts just over 800 decrees and
laws for the period from 403/2 to 322/1 BCE, and ca. 270 from before 403/2.21 This
is a very significant sample, which gives us considerable confidence on a variety
of formulas, grammatical constructions and terminology, to the extent that we
make confident restorations in lacunose inscriptions. They may not cover all of
Attic documentary language but, first, they leave no doubt that there was such a
language, and that it was both significantly different from and overlapping with
ordinary language;22 second, they show that documentary language used, in a
19 This is particularly evident in Hansen 2016, 446–449.
20 Hansen 2016, 442–445.
21 Lambert 2005, 130 n. 31; (forthcoming), n. 6.
22 Even in strictly grammatical terms, there are examples of forms and structures that are com-
mon in literary sources but consistently avoided in inscriptions, which always use other forms.
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variety of cases, very consistent formulas to convey particular bits of information;
third, they show that consistent language, structures and formulas were used
across very different kinds of decrees and laws (in topic and scope). Thus, ho-
norary decrees, laws and international treatises of the same period use for ins-
tance the same dating formulas, the same calendar (for the period we are con-
cerned with, the bouleutic calendar)23, and the same grammatical structures and
terms to convey the same meanings.
It is not the case, as Hansen seems to suggest, that „laws on legislation“
would have been written in a documentary language different from that of public
honours, international treatises or laws on silver coins or transportation
and storage. They would of course contain pieces of information, regulations
and prohibitions that are not paralleled in different kinds of decrees and laws,
but we should expect that when the meaning is the same, that should be
conveyed in the same way as in other inscriptions. Thus, for instance, the use of
συναπολογοσησομένους in the document to indicate elected public advocates is
suspect not simply because this term is unattested in inscriptions, but because
the meaning is attested, and conveyed consistently with other terms (primarily
syndikoi).24 Likewise, ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιειν͂ is not problematic simply because it
is a grammatical structure unattested in inscriptions; it is problematic because
this is not the structure inscriptions use when they talk about putting a matter to
the vote, and more generally ποιειν͂ is not the verb normally used with χειροτονία
and derivatives.25 Comparison with inscriptions is not a simple matter of
searching a particular form in the epigraphic corpus, but is rather to do with
finding out whether we do know from the corpus how a particular meaning or bit
of information was consistently conveyed, and checking whether the document
conforms to this. This is the way in which I apply the principle in my work, and it
presupposes only the basic recognition that Attic public documents conformed to
a distinctive documentary language and used formulas and structures roughly
consistently. These seem tome uncontroversial propositions. And I also note (and
One example which I note in my book (Canevaro 2013b, 35 n. 79) is the imperative in -τωσαν,
which for a significant period is common in literary texts but never used in epigraphic ones
(Threatte 1980–96, II., 462–466). Another example is αὔριον alone to mean ‚tomorrow‘ (see be-
low), which is perfectly good Greek andwidespread in literary language, but which is never used
in inscriptions, which always prefer to it, to convey the same meaning, εἰς (or ἐς) αὔριον (174
instances). That Threatte 1980–96 has been able to reconstruct so successfully a grammar of Attic
inscriptions that is recognizable yet significantly different in a variety of its features from ordi-
nary Attic grammar is in itself evidence that there was a documentary language.
23 See below pp. 116–118.
24 See below pp. 118–122.
25 See below pp. 107–108.
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take into account in my analyses) that „[s]light variations might not amount to
decisive evidence of forgery“.26
Hansen provides a long list of technical terms that are unattested in inscrip-
tions but found in the orators, but does not provide a single example of my work
disqualifying a document as a forgery because of themention of ameaning, figure
or institution that is unattested in inscriptions but attested, with the same terms,
elsewhere.When, on the other hand, the relevantmeaning, figure or institution is
attested in inscriptions, but the terminology, grammar and formulas is entirely
inconsistent, this casts doubts on the authenticity of the document. One or two
such instances are never enough in my analysis to deem a document non-au-
thentic, but several convey a strong impression of inauthenticity, and combined
with a variety of other problematic features contribute to a general verdict of in-
authenticity.
The specific examples of the alleged shortcomings of mymethod that Hansen
provides are in fact misguided and show that his is indeed a strawman argu-
ment.27 The first example comes from the law about adeia to discuss atimoi and
opheilontes preserved at Demosth. or. 24.45, which I consider authentic.28 Han-
sen notes that the document contains the expression μὴ ἔλαττον ἑξακισχιλίων, οἷς
ἂν δόξῃ κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις, and that although inscriptions do attest κρύβδην
ψηφίζεσϑαι (IG II2 1141l. 6; 1183l. 18; 1237l. 82), we never find ἑξακισχίλιοι and
none of the relevant inscriptions indicate a number. Because of this, he claims, if I
had applied my method consistently, I should have judged the document inau-
thentic, but I do not. This is a caricature of my method (and I never make such an
argument in the case of inauthentic documents). The expression in the document
describes a vote by secret ballot with the words κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις, which
finds perfect parallels in inscriptions. The law also prescribes that there should be
a quorum of six thousand, which we know existed in Athens, and was used only
in a small number of specific procedures.29 ἑξακισχίλιοι, attested or not, is the
only way to say six thousand in Greek, so it would be ridiculous to consider it a
mark of forgery because it is unattested in inscriptions – if we had an inscription
with the number six thousand spelled out, it would have ἑξακισχίλιοι. Hansen
also observes that none of the epigraphic examples with κρύβδην ψηφιζομένοις
has a number. But these inscriptions prescribe a vote by secret ballot, and there is
no reason to assume that they also prescribe a quorum without indicating it (and
certainly not a quorum of six thousand, as they are decrees of a tribe, of a deme
26 Canevaro 2013b, 34–35.
27 Hansen 2016, 444–446.
28 Canevaro 2013b, 127–132.
29 See Canevaro 2013b, 131–132.
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and of a phratry). If they had prescribed a quorum, it is likely that theywould have
indicated the quorumwith the relevant number. I do not consider this expression
as evidence of inauthenticity because it is not – where we have a parallel for the
relevant meaning in inscriptions (the secret ballot), the meaning is conveyed by
exactly the same formula, and the numeral is unparalleled because in none of
these cases the votes had a quorum of six thousand.
Hansenʼs second example is similarly misleading. It is the document with the
so-called decree of Epicrates of Demosth. or. 24.28.30 I judge this document a
forgery (and Hansen concurs), and one of the several problems that I find is that
the document expresses the meaning „tomorrow“ with αὔριον alone, which is
perfectly acceptable in ordinary Greek, but is never found in inscriptions, where
we always find (174 examples) αὔριονpreceded by εἰς (or ἐς) tomean, adverbially,
„tomorrow“. This is one instance in which the term used is perfectly good Greek
for the meaning to be conveyed, but we have overwhelming evidence that in
documentary language this meaning was always conveyed differently, and this
casts some doubts on the authenticity of the document. Hansenʼs objection is that
in the paraphrase we also find αὔριον by itself, and he wonders: „Must we then
emend αὔριον in Demosthenesʼ comment?“ It is unclear to me how this is rele-
vant. The issue is the language of the documents themselves, which must be
consistent with that of inscriptions, whereas here Hansen is talking about the
paraphrase, that, I argue, normally reports the contents of the relevant law or
decree accurately but, obviously, paraphrases them! Nowhere in my work do I
state that the paraphrases must fully conform to the language of inscriptions, or
that they do not often change documentary language into ordinary lang-
uage – they generally represent faithfully the contents of laws or decrees, but not
always their phrasing, and I stress that the language of the literary sources does
not in fact conform to documentary language. If the document had εἰς αὔριον
while the paraphrase has αὔριον by itself, that would be in fact an argument for
authenticity – an instance in which the document would preserve documentary
language where the paraphrase translates it into ordinary Attic Greek. But it does
not, it shows a form that is inconsistent with overwhelming epigraphic evidence,
and this is evidence of inauthenticity (not necessarily conclusive evidence, but it
contributes to the overall case). The form found in the paraphrase is entirely ir-
relevant.
30 Canevaro 2013b, 104–113.
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3. Reconstructing nomothesia: reading the
evidence
It is now time to turn to the procedures of nomothesia and to the document at
Demosth. or. 24.20–3. In my original treatment, I identified four key and decisive
differences between the procedure described in the document at Demosth. or.
24.20–3 and the information about nomothesia found in the paraphrase of the
same speech and in other sources (oratorical and epigraphic).31 I quote from my
summary:
„(1) The procedure described by Demosthenes is one for enacting new laws,
whereas the document provides for an annual vote of approval of the entire
‚code‘ of lawsand for the rejection of some. (2) Demosthenes describes a
preliminary vote to allow new proposals (plural) to be made, whereas the
document describes a vote of approval for the existing laws section by sec-
tion. (3) The document sets this vote of approval in the 11th day of the first
prytany of every year and provides, in case some laws are not approved, for
the appointment of the nomothetai following a discussion ‚in the last of the
three Assemblies‘. Demosthenes, on the other hand, supported by the epi-
graphic evidence, shows that the nomothetai could be appointed at any point
of the year. (4) The document provides for the election of five synegoroi in the
same Assembly on the 11th of the first prytany. Demosthenes, on the other
hand, implies that they were appointed later after the proposals for new laws
had been presented. A closer analysis of the features of the document con-
firms that it cannot be an authentic Athenian statute.“
Themost substantial section of Hansenʼs article is dedicated to arguing that these
inconsistencies do not exist, and that the text of the „Against Timocrates“ can be
read in a way that confirms the account of the document.32 Hansen looks in De-
mosthenesʼ paraphrase for evidence that Demosthenes is describing a procedure
31 Canevaro 2013a, 152; 2013b, 96.
32 Hansen 2016, 445–462. On the problem with this approach, which starts from the document
and looks for confirmation of its statements, see above section 2.2. Hansen dedicates pp. 449–51
to listing the main (very general) features that seem to be consistent in the document and in the
paraphrase. This, however, contributes little to the discussion. If the document was fabricated to
be a reconstruction (however clumsy andunreliable) of the procedure described in Demosthenesʼ
account, then it is obvious that there must be some general similarities between the two (we find
some general similarities between documents and paraphrases even in Demosth. or. 18!). What
matters, aside from some general points of similarities, is whether we can find inconsistencies in
the details of the procedure.
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of general review and approval of the laws of the city by section (against incon-
sistencies 1 and 2)33 and that this procedure was a set item in the agenda of the
first Assembly meeting of the year, on the 11th of Hekatombaion (against incon-
sistency 3).34He does not deal here with inconsistency 4, because the existence of
this inconsistency depends on the existence of inconsistencies 1, 2 and 3.35 I shall
deal here with Hansenʼs arguments about the inconsistencies between the pro-
cedures in the document and in the paraphrase in three separate sections: first I
shall examine his claims and arguments for the existence of an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν
νόμων as a review of the existing laws that could (but did not need to) result in the
enactment of new laws (section 3.1); second, I shall examine his claims and ar-
guments that such a reviewwas held annually andwas a set item in the agenda of
the first Assembly meeting of the year (section 3.2); third, I shall examine his
reading of this ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as a two-stage procedure allegedly
consistent with that described in the document (section 3.3).
3.1 A procedure for reviewing, rejecting or confirming all the
existing laws?
Hansenʼs starting point for his reconstruction of nomothesia and for the analysis
of Demosthenesʼ paraphrase is a demonstration that both the document and the
paraphrase describe in fact a procedure of review of all the laws of the city (by
section).36 That such a review, a distinctive procedure identified explicitly as an
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων, existed is the foundation of Hansenʼs argument, and
also stands behind his later discussion of two different models of ἐπιχɛιροτονία,
one of which is followed in the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων.37He states immediately,
as uncontroversial, that „[t]he procedure of epicheirotonia is described both in the
document and by Demosthenes in his paraphrase“. Is this correct?
The document undeniably describes an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων, a distinc-
tive procedure with this name composed of several votes on different sections of
the „code“ of the laws of Athens. These individual votes, all collectively described
as an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων, are in fact described as votes in two steps between
two alternatives, i. e. as διαχειροτονίαι.38 Thus, the document uses the word
33 Hansen 2016, 451–458.
34 Hansen 2016, 458–462.
35 Cf. Hansen 2016, 471–472.
36 Hansen 2016, 451–453.
37 Hansen 2016, 458–462.
38 See below pp. 85–89, 100–105.
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ἐπιχɛιροτονία as the name of the overall procedure, of which the individual votes
in two steps between two alternatives are parts. Hansenʼs claim that „[b]oth the
document and Demosthenes specify the epicheirotonia as a diacheirotonia, i. e. a
choice between two options“ is strictly speaking incorrect. The document de-
scribes a series of διαχειροτονίαι which are part of an overall ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν
νόμων. The paraphrase (as I have argued and aswe shall see) describes one single
διαχειροτονία, not multiple διαχειροτονίαι, and later refers to that one
διαχειροτονία using the verb ἐπιχɛιροτονεῖν.
The procedure described in the document has one salient feature: the focus in
most of the document is on rejecting and repealing existing laws. The
διαχειροτονίαι concern whether particular sections of the existing code of laws
are deemed to be satisfactory (δοκοῦσιν ἀρκɛιν͂) and the procedure can result in
particular laws being rejected (ἐὰν δέ τινɛς τῶν νόμων τῶν κɛιμένων
ἀποχɛιροτονηϑῶσι), with a later Assembly held in that case about those laws that
have been rejected (πɛρὶ τῶν ἀποχɛιροτονηϑέντων), which should discuss the
appointment of the nomothetai. For most of the document there is no mention
whatsoever of new law proposals. When new law proposals are finally men-
tioned, the document does not indicate that these proposals are compulsory –
that there need to be newproposals. Before theAssembly about the laws that have
been rejected (πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας), whoever wishes to make a proposal must
post it before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes (ὁ βουλόμɛνος ʼΑϑηναίων
ἐκτιϑέτω πρόσϑɛ τῶν ἐπωνύμων). Thewording indicates that newproposals are a
possibility, fully dependent on volunteers, but not a necessary part of the pro-
cedure (cf. τοὺς νόμους οὓς ἂν τιϑῇ), and there is no requirement that those who
proposed the rejection of one of the existing laws must enact a new law. The
document describes a procedure that could end with the repealing of one of the
existing laws without any new law being enacted. Hansen sees this and notes in
his analysis of the document that before the nomothetai the elected advocates
„are to defend the laws in force which have been provisionally rejected by the
Assembly and submitted to the nomothetai for a final decision about approval or
repeal“. He also notes that „[a]fter the first ekklesia, any Athenian can propose an
alternative to laws rejected in the epicheirotonia“, and that „[t]he presumption is
that the citizen(s) who raised the matter in the ekklesia and succeeded in per-
suading the demos to reject a law will propose – or perhaps even be obliged to
propose –an alternative, but in the law that is not stated as a requirement“.39 This
is correct – the procedure described in the document is a procedure for repealing
existing laws, which may but need not involve the proposal of new ones, and can
result in the repealing of one or more of the existing laws without the approval of
39 Hansen 2016, 448.
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new ones. Conversely, the paraphrase (as I have argued, and as we shall see)
describes a procedure for the enactment of new laws – the initial vote (δι-
αχειροτονία) is in fact on whether new laws need to be proposed (εἰσοιστέος at
Demosth. or. 24.25) – which can but need not involve the repealing of existing
laws.
One striking feature of the paraphrase is that Demosthenes does not actually
use the word ἐπιχɛιροτονία at all. When he describes what the laws prescribe
(Demosth. or. 24.25), he states that they καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐφʼ ὑμιν͂ ἐποίησαν δι-
αχειροτονίαν. He then describes what this διαχειροτονία is about: πότερον
εἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς ἢ δοκοῦσιν ἀρκειν͂ οἱ κείμενοι. Demosthenes then
states that after this procedural step (viz. the διαχειροτονία), if you (the Athe-
nians) vote tomake proposals (ἂν χειροτονῆτʼ εἰσφέρειν), not even then new laws
can be immediately enacted (but one has to publicise them first and wait a set
period of time). What Demosthenes describes here, strictly speaking, is one
double vote (διαχειροτονία) about whether proposals can be made (or, on the
other hand, as stressed by Hansen, whether the existing laws are satisfactory).
According to the text, the next procedural step (μετὰ ταῦτα) is making proposals
and enacting new laws (which is specified as taking place after the Assembly at
which the διαχειροτονία is held). There is no mention of multiple διαχειροτονίαι
on various sections of the law code, which collectively take the name of
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων. There is only, following the text, one single δι-
αχειροτονία, which the text describes as such. One would be hard pressed to read
between the lines of this description a reference tomultiple votes by section on all
the laws of the city (as the document describes), followed by individual votes on
individual statutes (as Hansen, somewhat arbitrarily, postulates; see below pp.
93–94, 105). And no one would ever dream to formulate such a hypothesis if it
were not for the need to reconcile this paraphrase with the document.
The expression ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων (or the word ἐπιχɛιροτονία alone) is
alsonot found in thenext section (Demosth.or. 24.26), todesignate theoverarching
procedure that tookplace in theAssembly. Allwe find is amentionof theAssembly
at which Timocrates, immediately and in violation of the times set by the law,
passedthedecree summoning thenomothetai for thenextday,as theAssembly ἐνᾗ
τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε. InHansenʼs reading this very quick referencedoes
a lotofwork („Thecrucialpassage isDemosthenesʼdescriptionof theepicheirotonia
[26]“)40. It refers to theoverallprocedureof the ἐπιχɛιροτονίατῶν νόμων, including
multiple διαχειροτονίαι on various sections of the code of law and later votes on
individual statutes in thesesections. It indicates,paceDemosthenesʼaccount in the
previous paragraph and in accordance with the document, that the procedure was
40 Hansen 2016, 453–454.
The Authenticity of the Document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3 85
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/6/18 10:46 AM
viewedas a reviewof all the laws of the city,whichmay possibly result in new laws
beingenacted,andnotprimarilyasapreliminaryvote thatallowedtheprocedureto
enact new laws to be set inmotion.
A close reading of the context makes one doubt that so much can be built on
this brief expression, and suggests that it should be interpreted more simply as a
neutral reference to the διαχειροτονία described at the previous paragraph. At
Demosth. or. 24.26, Demosthenes zooms in on Timocratesʼ behaviour, concent-
rating on the lack of publicity for his proposal and the failure to respect the times
prescribed by the law. In this context, Demosthenes does not introduce new ele-
ments, but rather applies the description of the correct procedures summarised
and paraphrased at the previous paragraph to the specific example of Timocratesʼ
behaviour. He prefaces his description of Timocratesʼ behaviour with an explicit
reference to the rules discussed at the previous paragraph: τούτων μέντοι
τοσούτων ὄντων οὐδὲν πεποίηκε Τιμοκράτης οὑτοσί. Every feature of Timocratesʼ
infractions is exactly matched by a procedural feature described at the previous
paragraph, and refers back to it without introducing or presupposing any more
information than what had already been said in the previous paragraph: Ti-
mocrates did not give the law the required publicity (Demosth. or. 24.26: οὔτε γὰρ
ἐξέϑηκε τὸν νόμον; Demosth. or. 24.26: προσέταξαν τοις͂ βουλομένοις εἰσφέρειν
ἐκτιϑέναι τοὺς νόμους πρόσϑεν τῶν ἐπωνύμων); he did not allowwhoeverwished
so to read and study his proposal (Demosth. or. 24.26: οὔτʼ ἔδωκεν εἴ τις ἐβούλετʼ
ἀναγνοὺς ἀντειπειν͂; Dem. 24.25: ἵνʼ ὁ βουλόμενος σκέψηται, κἂν ἀσύμφορον ὑμιν͂
κατίδῃ τι, φράσῃ καὶ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀντείπῃ); he did not respect the required times
(Demosth. or. 24.26: οὔτʼ ἀνέμεινεν οὐδένα τῶν τεταγμένων χρόνων ἐν τοις͂
νόμοις; Dem. 24.25: οὐκ εὐϑὺς τιϑέναι προσέταξαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τρίτην ἀπέδειξαν
ἐκκλησίαν […] ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ τούτῳ).
Given the structure of the argument here and the continuous references to the
features described in the previous paragraph, the brief expression ἐν ᾗ τοὺς
νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε should be read in the light of what we find at Demosth.
or. 24.25, and presuppose nothingmore thanwhatwe find at Demosth. or. 24.25. It
should be read, that is, as a neutral reference to the διαχειροτονία described
above,which ismeant to recall it, and not to add to it, set it within awider context,
correct it or modify it. In my original article, I provided a discussion of the
meaning of ἐπιχɛιροτονɛιν͂ and ἐπιχɛιροτονία that supported this reading and
showed that these terms are not used in reference to a distinctive kind of pro-
cedure called ἐπιχɛιροτονία (which can allegedly occur in specific forms), but as
generic terms that indicate respectively the act of voting upon a matter and the
resulting vote upon a matter.41 Hansen concedes that my discussion of this issue
41 Canevaro 2013a, 145–146; 2013b, 87–88.
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is persuasive (but fails to draw the consequences, and continues to discuss
ἐπιχɛιροτονία as if it were a specific and distinctive kind of procedure for the rest
of his article).42 If my discussion is persuasive, as Hansen states, then τοὺς
νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε needs not mean „you held an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν
νόμων“ as a specific complex procedure, but simply „you voted on the laws“, a
perfectly acceptable way of referring to the διαχειροτονία (πότερον εἰσοιστέος
ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς ἢ δοκοῦσιν ἀρκειν͂ οἱ κείμενοι) described at Demosth. or. 24.25,
which does not add anything to what we learnt about it from Demoth. or. 24.25.
And nowhere at Demosth. or. 24.25 (or elsewhere) does Demosthenes suggest or
imply that that διαχειροτονία was part of a complex ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων,
consisting of several votes and amounting to a review of the „code“ of laws by
section, as described in the document. Demosth. or. 24.25 expressly describes one
single διαχειροτονία „on whether new laws need to be proposed, or the existing
laws are deemed to be satisfactory“, not several, and leaves no space for further
votes by section. This is incompatible with what the document describes. And
Demosth. or. 24.26 refers back to that description and adds nothing to it – the use
of ἐπεχειροτονήσατε does not at all imply a wider procedure.
Hansen misunderstands my analysis when I state that „the obvious reading
of ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε at § 26 is therefore ‚at which you voted on
the laws‘ (plural), meaning ‚on whether laws can be proposed‘“.43 He counters:
„But here τοὺς νόμους must be all laws, viz. οἱ κείμενοι [νόμοι], not just laws in
general.“44 This is certainly true, butmy statement did not imply that τοὺς νόμους
indicated generic laws, possibly the new laws to be enacted. It simply read (as
Hansen does) the expression „you voted on the laws“ as a reference to the
διαχειροτονία of Demosth. or. 24.25, which is explicitly described as being „on
whether new laws need to be proposed, or the existing laws are deemed to be
satisfactory“.45He concentrates on the fact that the alternative to the requirement
to enact new laws in the διαχειροτονία at Demosth. or. 24.25 is phrased as
δοκοῦσιν ἀρκειν͂ οἱ κείμενοι (sc. νόμοι), parallel to τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε
of Demosth. or. 24.26, and insists that to vote that no new laws were needed was
equivalent to a vote of confidence for the laws of the city as a whole.46 I do not
deny that the alternative could be (and was) conceptualised as such, and I have
argued elsewhere that the laws were understood by the Athenians as a rational
and coherent whole which was the expression of a unified rationality – within
42 Hansen 2016, 454.
43 Canevaro 2013a, 146; 2013b, 89.
44 Hansen 2016, 454.
45 I follow here Hansen in rendering εἰσοιστέοςmore strongly, see below p. 89.
46 Hansen 2016, 453–454.
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such a framework, it is unsurprising that enacting new laws could be understood
and described as considering the laws overall unsatisfactory, and deciding not to
enact any as a confirmation (‚a vote of confidence‘) that the laws as they are, are in
fact satisfactory.47 But we are still left with only one διαχειροτονία, no multiple
votes on various sections of the ‚code‘ of laws, no individual votes on specific
statutes to be rejected, no ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as an overarching procedure
of which several διαχειροτονίαιwere part. Demosthenes is describing explicitly a
preliminary vote onwhether new laws need to be proposed, the converse of which
is described as deeming the existing laws to be satisfactory. Only by a consider-
able sleight of hand can this be interpreted as consistent with a procedure named
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων that prescribed multiple διαχειροτονίαι on various
sections of the ‚code‘ of laws followed by individual votes to reject individual laws
within those sections – a procedure, what is more, that did not require new law
proposals to be made, and could end simply with the repealing of one or more of
the existing laws.
This brings us to the other key issue: Demosthenesʼ paraphrase, in accor-
dance with the discussion at Demosth. or. 24.17–20, focuses on the issue of pro-
posing and enacting new laws. It states explicitly that the διαχειροτονία is on
whether a new law needs to be enacted – Hansen correctly stresses that
εἰσοιστέος implies necessity, so a vote for this option is a statement that it is the
view of the demos that a new law must be enacted, because the laws as they are
not satisfactory.48 Thus, there is no escaping the fact that the procedure described
by Demosthenes must end with the enactment of a new law, whereas it is unclear
whether any of the existing laws necessarily needs to be repealed.49 The pro-
cedure described in the document, conversely, always results, if successful, in the
repealing of one of the existing laws, whereas enacting new laws is a possibility
but not a necessity – it fully depends on volunteers who decide to bring re-
placement proposals.50 In Hansenʼs words „[t]he presumption is that the citizen
(s) who raised the matter in the ekklesia and succeeded in persuading the demos
to reject a law will propose –or perhaps even be obliged to propose – an alter-
native, but in the law that is not stated as a requirement“.51 It is hard to see how
such a procedure as the one described in the document, which did not impose as a
requirement to propose new laws might be consistent with one that is described
47 Canevaro 2018.
48 Hansen 2016, 452–453.
49 This depends on whether any of the existing laws contradicts the new one, see Canevaro
2016a on the rules and procedures governing this aspect.
50 See above p. 85.
51 Hansen 2016, 448.
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as startingwith a vote onwhether εἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς („a new law needs
to be proposed“).
In fact, one passage, Demosth. or. 3.10, that I did not analyse in my original
treatment strongly suggests that a procedure of fixed annual review of all the laws
of the city (by section) whose purpose was to repeal some of them (but which did
not require new laws to be proposed) could not exist in the period when the
speech was delivered.52
Demosthenes in the „Third Olynthiac“ (3.10), a speech of 349/8, only five
years later than the „Against Timocrates“, addresses the Athenians in the As-
sembly with the following words: „Do not be amazed, men of Athens, if I say
something that most of you will find unexpected. You should appoint lawmakers.
Use these lawmakers not to pass a law – you have enough of them – but to repeal
those laws that are presently harming your interests“ (trans. Trevett). He expects
that the Athenians will be surprised (μὴ […] ϑαυμάσητε) to hear that he advises
summoning the nomothetai not to enact a new law (μὴ ϑῆσϑε νόμον μηδένα), but
to repeal some of the existing laws. This indicates, first, that the normal respon-
sibility of the nomothetai was to enact new laws; second, that normally the pro-
cedure of nomothesia was concerned with proposing and enacting new laws;
third, that it was unusual that the procedure might result in the repealing of one
or more laws.53 Such a statement would surely make no sense if there existed in
Athens at the time a momentous annual procedure called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νό-
μων, taking place as a fixed item in the agenda of theAssembly at the firstmeeting
of the year, the only procedure ever to occur in theAssembly before the discussion
of the sacred business,54 that consisted of a series of votes to reject some of the
existing laws, and would result in the repeal of these laws by the nomothetai. One
may argue that what is paradoxical here is not to have a law repealed by the no-
mothetai but rather to have a law repealed without passing an alternative law.
This reading is already problematic if we accept the document at Demosth. or.
24.20–3, which provides for laws to be repealed but contains no requirement that
an alternative should be proposed. But, in fact, the remark εἰσὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἱκανοί
after the exhortation ἐν δὲ τούτοις τοῖς νομοϑέταις μὴ ϑῆσϑε νόμον μηδένα (which
is what is supposed to be παράδοξον) suggests that the result of using the no-
mothetai the normal way would be to increase the number of laws, which is to be
52 I analyse this passage, making similar remarks but in the service of a different general point
also in Canevaro 2016a, 43.
53 This is further evidence against the authenticity of the document at Demosth. or. 24.33, which
supplements Canevaro 2013a, 156–158; 2013b, 102–104. For the correct forum for repealing exist-
ing laws see Canevaro 2016.
54 See below pp. 106–107 on this.
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avoided because there is enough of them (Demosth. or. 24.142 and 20.91–2 also
lament that there are too many laws). If the new laws that Demosthenes exhorts
the Athenians not to enact were only replacement laws (let alone if no replace-
ments were proposed), then they would not add to the number of Athenian laws,
which would remain the same (or decrease), and therefore there would be no
need to remark εἰσὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἱκανοί. This expression makes better sense if we
understand it to mean that the normal role of the nomothetai was to enact new
laws and not to repeal existing ones. But making such a statement would have
been impossible if the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as described in the document had
existed at the time. It is on the other hand fully compatible with a procedure to
enact new laws involving a preliminary (double) vote in the Assembly onwhether
new laws need to be proposed or the existing laws are deemed to be satisfactory as
they are. It is a further piece of evidence that is fully consistent withmy reading of
the paraphrase at Demosth. or. 24.17–19 and 24–26 (and the rest of the evidence),
but which causes problems if we accept the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3.
3.2 An annual ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as a set item on the
agenda of the Assembly?
Hansenʼs chief argument in support of the existence of an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν
νόμων required to be held in the first Assemblymeeting of the year, on the 11th day
of the first prytany, is based on a misunderstanding of Demosth. or. 24.48, which
he reads out of context. In the passage, Demosthenes states that Timocrates
should have first gone to the Council, which would then put the matter on the
agenda of the Assembly.55 Hansen states that „neither Timokrates nor anybody
else had approached the boule about a new law concerning the Panathenaia to be
debated at the ekklesia“. Because the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων was not on the
agenda of the Assembly on the 11th of Hekatombaion following a probouleuma of
the Council, then, according to Hansen, it must follow that it was a set item on the
agenda of that particular first Assembly meeting of the year. The problem with
this argument is that it takes no account of the context in which the statement is
found. The context makes clear that the mention of the lack of a probouleuma is
connected to the proposal of Timocrates and to theAssemblymeeting of the 12th of
Hekatombaion, and not to that of the 11th, and therefore tells us nothing about
whether there was a probouleuma for the vote on the 11th.
55 Hansen 2016, 454–455.
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At Demosth. or. 24.45 the grammateus reads out the law on adeia for dis-
cussing matters pertaining to atimoi and public debtors.56 Demosthenes argues
(speciously) that because of this law, Timocrates should have obtained adeia
before proposing a law that revoked imprisonment on public debtors (Demosth.
or. 24.46). The topic is here clearly the actual law of Timocrates on public debtors
(not generically any law, or a law about the Panathenaia). At Demosth. or. 24.47
the orator follows up on this point and states that even after one has obtained the
adeia (which Timocrates had not), one must still follow the correct procedures.
From the general point Demosthenes then zooms in on Timocratesʼ behaviour:
Timocrates not only did not obtain the adeia and spoke and made a proposal
about matters pertaining to public debtors nevertheless (τῷ δʼ οὐκ ἀπέχρησε
τοῦτʼ ἀδικειν͂ μόνον, εἰ μὴ δοϑείσης τῆς ἀδείας λέγει καὶ νόμον εἰσφέρει περὶ
τούτων). In addition, he presented his law secretively, when the Council was
adjourned and the others were busy with the festival, so he did not inform either
the Council or the demos about these matters (περὶ τούτων, i. e. about his law on
public debtors), he did not discuss his proposal on public debtors either in the
Council or in the Assembly (ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέτʼ οὐκ εἰς τὴν βουλήν, οὐκ εἰς τὸν
δῆμον εἰπὼν περὶ τούτων οὐδέν). PaceHansen, what Demosthenes is referring to
here is not discussions in the Council that should have preceded the meeting and
the preliminary vote (Hansenʼs so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία) of the 11th of Heka-
tombaion, in which it was decided to allow law proposals and nomothetai were
appointed (illegally)57 to enact laws concerning the Panathenaia. He is referring
to events after that vote, to the 12th of Hekatombaion. This is made clear by the
remark that the Council was adjourned and the others were busy because of the
festival – the Council was convened in the morning of every Assembly day, so it
must have met on the 11th of Hekatombaion. It did not, because of the festival,
meet on the 12th. Hansenʼs statement that „neither Timokrates nor anybody else
had approached the boule about a new law concerning the Panathenaia to be
debated at the ekklesia“, on the basis of which he argues that the ἐπιχɛιροτονία
τῶν νόμων was a mandatory item on the agenda that did not require an ad hoc
probouleuma, is thus incorrect. The passage says nothing about how the
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων of the 11th of Hekatombaion came to be on the agenda,
because it talks about the events of the 12th.
The summary of the procedure that Timocrates should have followed pro-
vided by Demosthenes at Demosth. or. 24.48 confirms this: that Timocrates
should have spoken first to the Council is explicitly linked to the law just read out,
that on adeia (εἰδότα τὸν νόμον τόνδ' ὃν ἀνέγνω) – he should have convinced the
56 On this law see Canevaro 2013b, 127–132.
57 See below p. 104.
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Council to set a vote on adeia on the agenda of the Assembly, which was needed
(according to Demosthenesʼ argument here) before one could make a proposal
about public debtors. Only afterwards, once a discussion about adeia in the As-
sembly had taken place (δήμῳ διαλεχϑῆναι) and if the demos were to grant the
adeia (εἰ πᾶσιν Ἀϑηναίοις ἐδόκει), should Timocrates have written a law proposal
and legislated about such matters, i. e. public debtors (γράφειν καὶ νομοϑετειν͂
περὶ τούτων), and in doing so he should also (καὶ τότε) have respected the times
set by the law on nomothesia. The entire section is in fact about the need to obtain
adeia and the relevant procedures, and the need to follow the procedures of no-
mothesia (and stick to the correct times), which had been discussed extensively at
Demosth. or. 24.26–28, is recalled only at the end, as an afterthought (notice the
καὶ τότε), to reiterate an argument made before. Thus, the entire section concerns
Timocratesʼ behaviour on the 12th of Hekatombaion, when he failed to follow the
correct procedures to propose a law about public debtors, and in addition failed to
respect the times prescribed by the law on nomothesia. It says nothing about the
so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων of the 11th, and does not support Hansenʼs
contention that such an ‚ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων‘was a fixed item on the agenda
of that meeting. Hansenʼs statement that „[t]he epicheirotonia on Hekatombaion
11 cannot have been held in consequence of Timokratesʼ wish to have the law on
the Panathenaia changed, and the presumption is that it was an obligatory item
on the agenda for the first meeting of the year“ is thus not supported by the evi-
dence of the speech (or by evidence elsewhere). In fact, although Demosthenes
throughout the speech accuses Timocrates of all sorts of procedural infractions
and illegalities, the one accusation thatwe do not find anywhere is that the decree
summoning the nomothetai was aprobouleuton (see Demosth. or. 24.27–8).58
Apart from this passage, which does not support his contention that there
existed an annual procedure called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων, Hansenʼs other re-
marks on this matter are inconclusive. He tries to explain Demosthenesʼ silence in
the paraphrase of the law on nomothesia about the fact that this was an annual
procedure of approval of the laws of the city by section by hypothesising that the
orator chose not tomention this because it was not an aspect in which Timocrates
had acted „unconstitutionally“.59 This is guesswork. In fact, by the same token,
Timocrateshadnotacted ‚unconstitutionally‘ in thecontextof the initialvote in the
Assembly either (his illegal behaviour started with the decree that summoned the
nomothetai for the next day, without respecting the required times and the requi-
rements of publicity), and yet the paraphrase discusses that vote extensively.
Moreover, if the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμωνwas held by section as prescribed in the
58 The document found at Demosth. or. 24.27 is however a forgery, see Canevaro 2013b, 104–113.
59 Hansen 2016, 456.
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document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3, then it is hard to understand how laws on the
managementof thePanathenaiacouldpossibly fallunder thesamesectionasa law
about imprisonment for public debtors. That Timocratesʼ proposal did not fall
under the section that had not been „confirmed“ (according to the procedure
prescribed in the document) would surely constitute a further infraction worth
mentioning. Hansenʼs explanation of the alleged silence does not work.
More generally, an annual procedure of ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων of the kind
prescribed by the document and reconstructed by Hansen, the only item ever to
be placed in the Assembly agenda (according to the document and to Hansenʼs
reconstruction)60 before sacred matters, would have constituted a momentous
occasion, one of which we would expect to find some trace, somewhere.61 Yet
such a procedure is not mentioned anywhere in our sources, not even here and in
Demosth. or. 20, where the speaker actually takes the time to summarise the
regulations on nomothesia in considerable detail. Hansen also hypothesises that
Demosthenesʼ long discussion of how the ἐπιχɛιροτονία was conducted at De-
mosth. or. 24.25 may have felt superfluous if this procedure was used every time a
new law was proposed.62 It would have been equally „superfluous“ if this was a
momentous procedure (once again, the only one held before the sacred matters)
which happened every year, without fail, in the first Assembly meeting of the
year, and which involved the confirmation of all the laws of the city by section.
But the orators do not normally refrain from explaining in detail matters that the
judges know already, and often even make the point that what they are about to
say is something the Athenians already know.63 Hansenʼs remarks here are in-
conclusive.
Hansen also states: „in my opinion it is unlikely that every proposal for a law
had to be initiated with an epicheirotonia about whether the laws in force were
sufficient or a new law was needed (see § 21 and 25)“. He also worries that if „an
epicheirotonia on whether a new law was needed or the laws in force were suffi-
cient“ was needed in all instances, then „any bill could have been stopped im-
mediately the first time it was presented to the Assembly even before it could be
debated, namely if the demos in the preliminary epicheirotonia had voted that the
laws in force were sufficient“.64 The whole procedure of nomothesia seems to be
60 See below p. 106–107.
61 The existence of such a regular procedure to repeal existing laws would also contradict Han-
senʼs (2016, 453) contention that „[t]he ancient Greeksʼ view on laws and legislation was that
stable laws were best and the fewer changes of law, the better“.
62 Hansen 2016, 457.
63 On the topos „you all know“ see Pearson 1964, 215–219; Ober 1989, 181; Pelling 2000, 28–31;
Hesk 2000, 227–230; Steinbock 2013, 42–43; Canevaro 2018.
64 Hansen 2016, 456–457.
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designed to ensure as much caution as possible, in a variety of institutional set-
tings and with as many hurdles as possible, on the possibility of enacting a new
law.65 It is not surprising that the Athenians should impose a preliminary vote
even for initiating the procedure. And we do in fact have a parallel for such a
blanket vote preceding any discussion and proposals in a particular area: the law
on adeia,66 which prescribed a preliminary generic vote on whether matters
pertaining to atimoi and public debtors should be discussed, before any discus-
sion could take place and proposals be made (in accordance with the normal
Assembly procedures). The preliminary vote on nomothesia worked in precisely
the same way.
Hansen admits that the epigraphic evidence shows that the Athenians could
enact new laws at any point of the year, and that this is inconsistent with the
procedure described in the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3.67 His answer to
this problem is to postulate other, different nomothesia procedures that regulated
the enactment of laws at other points of the year, and he points to the document at
Demosth. or. 24.33 (and to the discussion of that document) as the law that gov-
erned one of these other procedures.68 I have shown in two articles that nothing
in Demosthenesʼ discussion at Demosth. or. 24.32, 34 and at Demosth. or. 20.88–
102 is incompatible with the procedure described at Demosth. or. 24.17–19 and
24–26, and that several elements strongly suggest that all these passages refer to
one law and to one procedure, which allowed for laws to be enacted at any point
of the year.69 That laws could be enacted at all points of the year is clear from the
inscriptional record: IG II3 1 445 was enacted on the 8th of Skirophorion, IG II3 1
320 in the ninth prytany, IG II2 140 in the fifth, the seventh or the tenth prytany.70
65 See in general Canevaro 2015.
66 On which see Canevaro 2013b, 127–132.
67 Hansen 2016, 456.
68 This is the line he also took in Hansen 1985. I argue elsewhere that that document is also a
forgery, see Canevaro 2013a, 156–158; 2013b, 102–104. In any case, the only reason for which one
needs to postulate that the paraphrase of that law (or the document itself at Demosth. or. 24.33)
describes a different, separate procedure, is to defend the reliability of the so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων of Demosth. or. 24.20–23 in the face of the evidence for laws enacted
at all points of the year. There is nothing in the text itself that requires us to postulate a separate
procedure, see Canevaro 2013a, 149–150 and 2016.
69 Canevaro 2013a and 2016.
70 Alessandrì 1980 noted that the law must have been enacted in the tenth prytany, because it
refers to the Council of the next year as in charge of supervising the collection of the aparchai. As
this collection took place in the ninth and the tenth prytanies, if the law had been enacted earlier
on in the year (and certainly if it had been enacted in the first prytany, as the document at
Demosth. or. 24.20–23 requires), then it would refer to the current Council, not to the next. I want
to thank Edward Harris for pointing me to this reference and its implications.
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Hansen does not bring to the discussion any evidence in the texts of the orators
(or in other sources) that contradicts this. Ultimately, the only reason for which he
invents different procedures that allowed to enact laws at all points of the year
(and for which there is no evidence) is to accommodate the document at Demosth.
or. 24.20–3 in his reconstruction. Nothing, apart from the document itself, re-
quires postulating such multiple procedures to account for what we know from
the sources.71 But, as I noted above in my methodological remarks, a re-
construction of the nomothesia procedures built on the basis of what we find in
the document, and devised to accommodate the document, cannot at the same
time serve as confirmation of the documentʼs authenticity. The argument be-
comes circular, unless the document has some independent and previous claim
to authenticity – and it does not, because, as recognized by Hansen, it is a later
addition to the speech, and many such additions are forgeries. The enactment of
laws in Athens at all points of the year is strong evidence against the authenticity
of the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3 and against the historicity of the pro-
cedure it describes, unless the existence of different procedures and of an annual
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων can be proven independently. But, as we have seen,
there is no evidence in the sources of such a procedure.
Hansenʼs only further piece of evidence for the existence of such a procedure
is comparative: an (allegedly) parallel procedure, described at Aischin. Ctes.
3.38–40, that, according to him, prescribes a similar (but separate) kind of annual
review of laws.72Hansen howevermisreads the details of Aeschinesʼ account, and
therefore fails to realise that this procedure has virtually nothing in commonwith
the so called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων. Hansenʼs summary of Aeschinesʼ account
is as follows:
„[The] law […] requires the thesmothetai to keep an eye on the laws of Athens:
if they find invalid laws in the corpus, or inconsistent laws, or more than one
law on the same point, the relevant laws are to be put before the people, who
will set up a board of nomothetai to settle the matter. This inspection of the
corpus of laws must be undertaken once every year. The prytaneis are re-
quested to summon an ekklesia where nomothetai are an obligatory item on
the agenda, and, as in the ekklesia held onHekatombaion 11, the procedure is
introduced by a diacheirotonia. To have an annual inspection of the laws in
71 The Occamʼs razor invoked by Hansen at p. 455 should rather apply here.
72 For previous treatments of this procedure (mentioned also, with reference to Aeschines, at
Theophrastus, Nomoi fr. 1 Szegedy-Maszak), and its relationship with the ad hoc commissioners
elected by the people to remove contradictory laws mentioned in Demosth. or. 20.91, see MacDo-
well 1975, 72; Rhodes 1984, 60; Hansen 1985, 356 (with Canevaro 2016b, 345–346 on Demosth. or.
20.91).
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force in order to eliminate invalid laws and conflicting laws is parallel to
having an annual inspection of the laws in order to decide whether new laws
are needed.“73
From a close analysis of Aeschinesʼwords, we see that Hansen has arbitrarily read
into the passage steps and features that are not attested in, or justified by, the
text, and that are based on his reading of the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων.
Aeschines starts his discussion by claiming that it is impossible that two contra-
dictory laws on the same topic (the award of crowns in the theatre of Dionysus)
may exist, because the lawgiver has clearly prescribed that the thesmothetai every
year must reconcile the laws after a careful investigation and examination
(διαρρήδην προστέτακται τοῖς ϑεσμοϑέταις καϑ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν διορϑοῦν ἐν τῷ
δήμῳ τοὺς νόμους, ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσαντας καὶ σκεψαμένους), in case there are
contradictions, invalid laws or multiple laws on the same subject (εἴ τις
ἀναγέγραπται νόμος ἐναντίος ἑτέρῳ νόμῳ, ἢ ἂκυρος ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ που εἰσὶ
νόμοι πλείους ἑνὸς ἀναγεγραμμένοι περὶ ἑκάστης πράξεως). Notice that the pas-
sage does not prescribe a specific procedure to be held every year, with fixed steps
(and a vote in the Assembly) and a fixed time, to revise or amend the laws. It
simply requires that every year the thesmothetai „keep an eye“ (in Hansenʼs
words) on the laws for the purpose of fixing problems (presumably because they
are the main magistrates in charge of the lawcourts), checking carefully for
irregularities. But this must not necessarily result in an actual procedure occur-
ring in the Assembly at a set point of the year. In fact, only if they find irregula-
rities (κἄν τι τοιοῦτον εὑρίσκωσιν), they must act. And what they are required to
do is not to go to the Assembly for a preliminary vote to initiate the procedure, but
rather to post the irregular law(s) before themonument of the EponymousHeroes,
exactly the same as proposers of new laws are required to do after the preliminary
vote that allows new proposals (in my reconstruction) or after the so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων (in Hansenʼs and the documentʼs procedure). No exa-
mination of the laws in the Assembly, the „review“ vote for which this procedure
is, according to Hansen, a parallel, is to be found in Aeschinesʼ account. All
Aeschines states is that τοὺς δὲ πρυτάνεις ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπιγράψαντας νο-
μοϑέτας. This has been read in two ways: either as „the prytaneis shall hold an
assembly labelling it nomothetai“, in Piérartʼs interpretation,74 or as „the pry-
taneis shall hold an assembly putting the appointment of nomothetai on the
73 Hansen 2016, 457–458.
74 This is Piérartʼs 2000 interpretation, who rejects Dobreeʼs emendation of νομοϑέτας into
νομοϑέταις.
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agenda“, in Rhodesʼ interpretation (supported by Hansen).75 I shall return below
to the issue of which interpretation is more consistent with the context and
wording of the passage. For the time being, this is immaterial: if the first inter-
pretation is correct, then this sentence brings us straight to the last stage of the
procedure, before the nomothetai; if the second interpretation is correct, it brings
us to the Assembly in which the decree of appointment of the nomothetai is
enacted, which in the procedure for which this account should allegedly be a
parallel happens several Assembly meetings later than the preliminary vote (in
my reading) or later than the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων (in Hansenʼs and
the documentʼs procedure), and does not involve any vote on actual laws or
proposals.76 In both scenarios, the mention of the ἐκκλησία in the passage is
relevant to a stage of the procedure later than the posting of (new or old) laws
before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes, and therefore, pace Hansen,
corresponds (and is parallel) not to an annual preliminary vote before the As-
sembly (the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων) that initiates the overall pro-
cedure, but to the vote on the decree of appointment of the nomothetai of De-
mosth. or. 24.25, whose existence neither of us doubts. Hansen cites Aischin. Ctes.
3.38–40 as a parallel for an annual fixed vote in the Assembly to initiate a pro-
cedure to check the laws, yet Aeschines does not mention any vote on laws in the
Assembly, to be held annually as an obligatory matter of business, and does not
therefore provide a parallel.
Hansen also states, in connection with Aischin. Ctes. 3.39, that „[t]he pry-
taneis are requested to summon an ekklesia where nomothetai are an obligatory
item on the agenda, and, as in the ekklesia held on Hekatombaion 11, the pro-
cedure is introduced by a diacheirotonia“. In fact, this passage is not as
straightforward as in Hansenʼs paraphrase, and far from supporting his argu-
ment, it introduces further problems for the document. The text of the man-
uscripts states that if the thesmothetai find that there are contradictions in the
laws, they must post the relevant laws before the monument of the Εponymous
Heroes. After this, the prytaneismust hold an Assembly ἐπιγράψαντας νομοϑέτας
(see above), and at that Assembly meeting the epistates of the proedroimust hold
a diacheirotonia on the question of the removal of one set of laws and the reten-
tion of the other (τὸν δ᾽ ἐπιστάτην τῶν προέδρων διαχειροτονίαν διδόναι τῷ δήμῳ
τοὺς μὲν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν νόμων, τοὺς δὲ καταλείπειν), so that theremay be only one
law on each issue (ὅπως ἂν εἷς ᾖ νόμος καὶ μὴ πλείους περὶ ἑκάστης πράξεως). So,
although it is clear from the paradosis that the διαχειροτονία is held before the
demos, it is also clear that the effect of the διαχειροτονία is that some laws are
75 This is Rhodesʼ 2003 interpretation, followed in Hansen 2016, 457.
76 For the issue of how many Assembly meetings later, see below pp. 114–116.
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retained and some others are repealed, straightaway, so that, as a result, there is
only one law on each subject, and no contradictory laws. Now, for this vote to
have this effect, the διαχειροτονία mentioned here must be the final conclusive
vote, not a previous, preliminary vote (as in the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νό-
μων) before the Assembly, which in its normal incarnation has no power to pass
or repeal laws. And such a conclusive vote is, according to all the evidence,meant
to be held before the nomothetai. The obvious conclusion is that this particular
Assembly is the nomothetai, and this is in fact, pace Rhodes, the most obvious
reading of τοὺς δὲ πρυτάνεις ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπιγράψαντας νομοϑέτας: „the
prytaneis shall hold an assembly labelling it nomothetai“.77 And the
διαχειροτονία is in fact mentioned, in this passage, after the posting of the
irregularities before the Eponymous Heroes, and after the mention of the nomo-
thetai. That this διαχειροτονία is held before the nomothetai is confirmed by the
next paragraph (Aischin. Ctes. 3.40), straight after the grammateus reads out the
law, where Aeschines summarises what has just been read out and applies it to
the case at hand, stating that if two contradictory laws had existed, „it is inevi-
table […] that once the thesmothetai had discovered them and the prytaneis had
handed them over to the nomothetai, one of the laws would have been annulled“
(ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἶμαι τῶν μὲν ϑεσμοϑετῶν ἐξευρόντων, τῶν δὲ πρυτάνεων
ἀποδόντων τοῖς νομοϑέταις ἀνῄρητʼ ἂν ὁ ἕτερος τῶν νόμων). The detailed desc-
ription of the procedure of Aischin. Ctes. 3.39 (τοὺς δὲ πρυτάνεις ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν
ἐπιγράψαντας νομοϑέτας, τὸν δʼ ἐπιστάτην τῶν προέδρων διαχειροτονίαν διδόναι
τῷ δήμῳ τοὺς μὲν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν νόμων, τοὺς δὲ καταλείπειν) is reformulated,
more synthetically, as τῶν δὲ πρυτάνεων ἀποδόντων τοῖς νομοϑέταις ἀνῄρητʼ ἂν
ὁ ἕτερος τῶν νόμων:78 the διαχειροτονίαmentioned by Aeschines is the final vote
before the nomothetai, not a „review“held at a previous stage, because, according
to Aeschinesʼ account, the ἐκκλησία in question is the nomothetai. Schöll saw that
this reading was the only possible one and, as a result, in order to reconcile
Aeschinesʼ account with the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3 (which states that
the nomothetai are selected from those that have sworn the Heliastic Oath), chose
to emend the passage: he emended, with Dobree (and most later editors)
νομοϑέτας into νομοϑέταις (after ἐπιγράψαντας), and deleted τῷ δήμῳ (after
διαχειροτονίαν διδόναι) to eliminate all features that show that the nomothetai
77 See Piérart 2000, pace Rhodes 2003.
78 The parallelism between the general description of the procedure at Aischin. 3.39 and the
application to the current case at Aischin. 3.40 makes it very clear that the action of the prytaneis
is linked directly to the session of the nomothetai, and not to an Assembly appointing the nomo-
thetai. This decisively supports Piérartʼs 2000 view against Rhodesʼ 2003.
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were here a special session of the Assembly.79 It is clear therefore that the pro-
cedure at Aischin. Ctes. 3.38–40 is not a parallel for the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων
as presented in the document and reconstructed by Hansen (a preliminary, not
final review), just further evidence of the final and decisive vote on laws by the
nomothetai, which is not an item of contention. Aischin. Ctes. 3.39–40 ismoreover
explicit evidence that the nomothetai, at least in this instance and at this time,
were in fact a special session of the Assembly, which is in direct contradiction
with the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–23, which states that the nomothetai are
selected from those that have sworn the Heliastic Oath (τοὺς δὲ νομοϑέτας εἶναι
ἐκ τῶν ὀμωμοκότων τὸν ἡλιαστικὸν ὅρκον).80
The procedure described by Aeschines is thus not a parallel for the so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων. In fact, if an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as a general
annual review of all the laws held at the first Assembly meeting of the year had
existed, it is hard to understand why the action of the thesmothetai in charge of
checking the regularity of the existing laws could not be integrated within it –
why did they not simply report to the Assembly about their findings over the year
of their tenure of office at the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων, the key event in the po-
litical year for revising the laws?
To conclude, paceHansen, nothing in the paraphrase of Demosthenes can be
read to refer to an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as a fixed item in the agenda of the
first Assembly of the year, and there is no reason (internal or external to the text)
to postulate that references to such a feature may have been omitted. None of the
passages discussed by Hansen supports this reading, and Demosthenesʼ text (in
combination with Demosth. or. 20 and the evidence of inscriptions) quite un-
ambiguously describes a procedure that could be started at any point of the year,
one that is incompatible with Hansenʼs reconstruction.
3.3 An ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων in two stages?
As noted in section 2.1, Hansen agrees with my analysis of the meaning of
ἐπιχɛιροτονɛιν͂ and ἐπιχɛιροτονία as a general expression for the act of voting on a
matter, and the vote itself on a matter.81 There is no evidence that by these terms
79 Schöll 1886. Cf. Adams 1919, 339 n. 4, in the Loeb, who also deletes τῷ δήμῳ and changes
νομοϑέτας into νομοϑέταις.
80 There is no independent evidence that this was the case, and Demosth. or. 20.93 cannot be
read to confirm it, see Canevaro 2016a, 46–49, 55–56. I plan to come back to the issue of the
identity of the nomothetai in a separate contribution.
81 Hansen 2016, 454.
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the Athenians described specific procedures – they were simply ways of descri-
bing votes that focused on the issue onwhich the vote was cast. Despite accepting
my analysis, Hansen proceeds throughout his article to treat ἐπιχɛιροτονία as a
distinctive kind of procedure, viewed as such by the Athenians, occurring in two
specific forms. Thus, in a section entitled „Three types of epicheirotonia“, Hansen
describes the two cases in which ἐπιχɛιροτονία was allegedly used, claims that I
identify the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as similar to one of the two, and
argues that it should rather be understood as similar to the other case.82 The two
cases identified by Hansen are that of the ἐπιχɛιροτονία about ostracism, and that
of the vote on the magistrates. The first, described at Aristot. Ath. pol. 43.5, is a
simple vote on whether the Athenians should hold an ostrakophoria or not (ἐπὶ δὲ
τῆς ἕκτης πρυτανείας πρὸς τοις͂ εἰρημένοις καὶ περὶ τῆς ὀστρακοφορίας
ἐπιχειροτονίαν δίδοασιν εἰ δοκεῖ ποιειν͂ ἢ μή). The second is the procedure for τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἐπιχειροτονεῖν εἰ δοκοῦσι καλῶς ἄρχειν held at every ekklesia kyria and
described at Aristot. Ath. pol. 43.5 and 61.2 (see also Aristot. Ath. pol. 61.4 and
Demosth. or. 48.27): a procedure to sanction or approve the works of the ma-
gistrates.
While the case of the preliminary vote on whether the ostrakophoria should
occur is a perfect parallel for the procedure I describe,83 Hansen claims that the
vote about the magistrates is a parallel for the procedure described in the docu-
ment, and proceeds to postulate silences and omissions in Demosthenesʼ para-
phrase to justify why the paraphrase does not in fact describe a two-tier
ἐπιχɛιροτονία as the document does. There are several problems with his analy-
sis: first, it is far from clear that Aristot. Ath. pol. 43.5, 61.2 61.4 and Demosth. or.
48.27 describe in fact a two-tier ἐπιχɛιροτονία – this is what Hansen reads into
these passages, but the supporting evidence is meagre; second, the paraphrase of
Demosthenes cannot be read to describe a two-tier ἐπιχɛιροτονία – it clearly
describes one single διαχειροτονία about whether new laws must be enacted or
the existing laws are considered satisfactory, and no second-stage votes about
individual laws; third, even if Hansenʼs reading of the paraphrase were accept-
able (and it is not), the procedure he describes still does not conform to that of the
document, because the paraphrase describes unequivocally one single ‚first‘
82 Hansen 2016, 458–462.
83 Note, however, that I nowhere claim that there existed two models of ἐπιχɛιροτονία and that
the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων conformed to that of the ostracism. This is how Hansen represents
my argument. In fact, I argue (Canevaro 2013a, 145–146) that this is a generic term, and the vote
on the ostracism is just a parallel for the kind of procedure I describe, as the vote on adeia also is
(see above pp. 87–89).
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vote, whereas the document has multiple ‚first‘ votes on various sections of the
law.
I shall first discuss the scanty evidence for the vote of confirmation of the
magistrates held in each ekklesia kyria. Hansen states that „[i]t was a general vote
whether or not the archai were performing their duties to the peopleʼs satisfac-
tion. A general vote of no confidence was followed by a second round in which
any citizen could charge any magistrate or board of magistrates with misconduct
in office. In each case a new vote of confidence was taken and a vote of no con-
fidence resulted in suspension of the magistrate or the board of magistrates in
question,whereafter the casewas referred to a dikasterion.“84 This appears to be a
very precise description of the procedure, yet is by and large the product of
guesswork. The main evidence cited by Hansen for a general vote on all the
magistrates, is Aristot. Ath. pol. 43.5: δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐπιχειροτονεῖν εἰ δοκοῦσι
καλῶς ἄρχειν. But this passage does not clarify that there existed an ἐπιχειροτονία
τῶν ἀρχῶν as one single vote on all magistrates; it states that at each ekklesia
kyria the law required to vote on the magistrates (τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐπιχειροτονεῖν),
which can be read either as the description of one vote, or as the description of
several different votes on each one of them (or on boards of them). Aristot. Ath.
pol. 61.2 mentions that an ἐπιχειροτονία δ᾽ αὐτῶν (of the strategoi) ἐστι κατὰ τὴν
πρυτανείαν ἑκάστην, and continues that κἄν τινα ἀποχειροτονήσωσιν, they need
to be tried in a lawcourt. Hansen reads this as one example of the second stage of
the procedure, after the preliminary single vote on all magistrates, when there are
individual votes on individual magistrates or boards. But this is Hansenʼs inter-
pretation – the passage simply refers to a vote on the strategoi as an ἐπιχειροτο-
νία, and nowhere states that this vote followed a preliminary vote on all ma-
gistrates. In fact, it states unequivocally that the vote on the strategoi occurred in
every prytany, which is incompatible with Hansenʼs interpretation, because, if
Hansen is right, the vote on the strategoiwould occur only if the preliminary vote
on all magistrates was one of rejection, and if someone denounced the strategoi.
Likewise, Aristot. Ath. pol. 61.4 states that the hipparchoi were also subjected to
an ἐπιχειροτονία – nomention of a preliminary vote on all magistrates, and of this
ἐπιχειροτονία being dependent on the result of that vote. Finally, the last passage
cited by Hansen, Demosth. or. 58.27, also does not support his reconstruction:
here we have one of the thesmothetaiwho is rejected (with thewhole board) at the
ἐπιχειροτονίαι, in the plural (αὐτὸς ἀπεχειροτονήϑη τῶν ἐπιχειροτονιῶν οὐσῶν).
There is, once again, no mention of a preliminary vote about all magistrates, and
the orator mentions the rejection in the context of a series of votes. To sum up,
none of these passages explicitly supports the reconstruction of this procedure as
84 Hansen 2016, 458–459, following Hansen 1975, 41–44.
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one involving two stages in the Assembly (before rejected magistrates were
brought to the lawcourts). Hansen postulates that the expressions hide two
stages, a preliminary single vote on all magistrates at one time, followed by in-
dividual votes on individual magistrates denounced by anyone of the Athenians.
And, accordingly, he reads Aristot. Ath. pol. 61.2, 61.4 and Demosth. or. 58.27 as
references to the second stage. This reconstruction may be possible, but, as we
have seen, it creates problems with Aristot. Ath. pol. 61.2 and 61.4, which state
that votes on individualmagistrates happened in every prytany, independently of
any preliminary vote, and is not directly supported by any of the passages – it is
nothing more than a hypothesis, certainly not a fact. And, as such, it cannot be
used, as if it were a fact, as a parallel for the procedure described in the document.
There is in fact no straightforward parallel in the sources for the two-tier pro-
cedure imagined by Hansen for the ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων.
Hansen builds his argument for a reconstruction of the so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as a procedure in two stages before the Assembly that
led to the rejection of specific laws (in accordance with the document) on a par-
allel that simply does not exist.85 He then proceeds to read the paraphrase of the
law so as to accommodate this reconstruction, but his reading is unwarranted by
the text. It is worth quoting Hansenʼs account of the paraphrase in full:86
„At the ekklesia held on the eleventh day of the first prytany = Hekatombaion
11 when the epicheirotonia took place, the people voted that the laws in force
were not sufficient and that a new lawmust be passed. Thereafter Timokrates
addressed the Assembly and argued that the law (or laws) about the Pan-
athenaia were insufficient and he persuaded the people that the admi-
nistration of the coming Panathenaia demanded an immediate change of the
law(s). If we accept the document at 20–23 as authentic, that debate must
have been followed by a further cheirotonia resulting in an apocheirotonia of
the law – or one of the laws – about the Panathenaia. […] Thereafter Timo-
krates or one of his associates proposed and carried a psephisma that a
session of nomothetai be held on the following day, in spite of the fact that
Hekatombaion 12 was an annual festival day devoted to the Kronia and no
meeting of the boule could normally be held because of the festival. Never-
theless a session of the nomothetai took place on Hekatombaion 12, and here
Timokrates proposed and carried his law.“
The problem with Hansenʼs account of the paraphrase is that its key part – the
section underlined here, which should integrate the two-stage procedure in the
85 Cf. Hansen 2016, 459–460.
86 Hansen 2016, 460–461.
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paraphrase – is nowhere to be found in the text of Demosthenes. Hansen has
postulated the omission by the orator of a key stage of the procedure, and a key
passage of the law just read out, on the basis of nothing else but the document
itself. First of all, there is nothing in the paraphrase that confirms that Timocrates,
after a first vote on the laws but before the second vote on individual laws, talked
about the law on the Panathenaia. Hansen cites three passages as evidence of
this, all out of context, and all referring to different stages of the procedure: De-
mosth. or. 24.26: ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Παναϑηναίων προφάσει; Demosth. or. 24.28: ἵνʼ ὡς
κάλλιστα γένοιτό τι τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑορτήν; Demosth. or. 24.29: περὶ μὲν τούτων,
τῆς διοικήσεως καὶ τῶν Παναϑηναίων οὔτε χείρονʼ οὔτε βελτίω νόμον οὐδένʼ
εἰσήνεγκεν οὐδείς. The second and the third quotes refer respectively to the
decree of appointment of the nomothetai and to the actual session of the nomo-
thetai, so have nothing to do with the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων of the
11th of Hekatombaion. The first passage, Demost. or. 24.26, also clearly refers to
the debate that led to the enactment of the decree of appointment of the nomo-
thetai (καϑέζεσϑαι νομοϑέτας διὰ ψηφίσματος ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Παναϑηναίων
προφάσει). Thus, paceHansen, all the relevant passages clearly set the discussion
of the deficiencies of the laws about the Panathenaia in the context of the
enactment of the decree of appointment of the nomothetai (which should have
been enacted several Assembly meetings later but was enacted illegally at the
same meeting as the initial vote). That debate did not take place after a first vote
about all the laws and before individual votes on particular laws, that is, during a
so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων: the text is explicit about this. Hansenʼs
account (with the supporting references he provides quoted out of context)
seriously misrepresents the text of the paraphrase.
After introducing a debate about the Panathenaia during the so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων for which there is no evidence, Hansen states that „[i]f
we accept the document at 20–23 as authentic, that debate must have been fol-
lowed by a further cheirotonia resulting in an apocheirotonia of the law – or one of
the laws – about the Panathenaia“. He recognizes that there is no trace of any of
this in the text, but muses that Demosthenes may have omitted this step because
Timocrates did not do anything wrong in this context. Yet Demosthenesʼ account
at Demosth. or. 24.25 is very precise and articulates a very tight temporal se-
quence, in which there is no room for the additional stage introduced by Hansen.
The orator starts his paraphrase of the law just read out stressing precisely the
temporal sequence of the various steps: the διαχειροτονία about whether a new
law must be proposed or the laws are sufficient as they are is introduced with the
words καὶ πρῶτον to mark its priority in the procedure. After this step (μετὰ
ταῦτα), Demosthenes stresses that one cannot immediately enact a new law, but
must wait for the third Assembly meeting, at which point the Athenians are to
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discuss the decree of appointment of the nomothetai. The wording of the sentence
strongly suggests that μετὰ ταῦτα refers precisely to the διαχειροτονία in the
previous sentence, and to nothing more (and makes the omission of a key step
very unlikely): μετὰ ταῦτα δέ is followed by the protasis ἂν χειροτονῆτʼ εἰσφέρειν,
with εἰσφέρειν recalling εἰσοιστέος of the διαχειροτονία– it is specifically the vote
that new laws must be proposed that is followed, and is the condition for, the
discussion of the appointment of the nomothetai and the enactment of new laws.
The wording does not allow for further steps of the procedure being hidden in
these words. And, in fact, in the next sentence, Demosthenes proceeds, with
another strong temporal expression (ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ), to list other requirements
to be fulfilled between the two relevant Assembly meetings, but nothing more is
to happen in the first Assembly meeting after the demos χɛιροτονɛιν͂ εἰσφέρειν.
The structure of the paraphrase, with its precise temporal sequence, makes it very
unlikely that Demosthenes may have failed to mention a key second step of the
initial procedural stage. And, as we have seen, there is no evidence whatsoever
(outside the document) that suggests that such a second step ever existed, and no
clear parallel for anything resembling it. Postulating such a step is special
pleading, motivated only by the attempt to save the document at all costs.
There is one more major problem with Hansenʼs argument in this section.
Hansen uses the section to make the twin arguments that Demosthenesʼ para-
phrase can be read as describing (or, rather, hiding) a procedure in two steps,
with an initial general διαχειροτονία of ratification of all the laws, followed by
multiple διαχειροτονίαι on specific laws, and that there is a parallel for such a
procedure. I have shown that both these claims are untenable. But even if we
were, hypothetically, to accept them, the procedure described is still not consis-
tent with the document. Hansen forgets here that the document does not pre-
scribe one general διαχειροτονία of ratification on all the laws followed by specific
διαχειροτονίαι on individual laws. It prescribes, as the initial step, a series of
διαχειροτονίαι on the laws by specific sections (see below, pp. 85–89), which
appear to be followed by further votes on individual laws. There is no general
διαχειροτονία on all the laws in the document, and, conversely, the paraphrase
describes the initial stage unequivocally as one single διαχειροτονία (καὶ πρῶτον
μὲν ἐφʼ ὑμῖν ἐποίησαν διαχειροτονίαν, πότερον εἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινὸς ἢ
δοκοῦσιν ἀρκεῖν οἱ κείμενοι), not as a series of votes by section. Hansenʼs argu-
ment in this section is unconvincing: he fails to provide a parallel for the pro-
cedure in two stages he envisages, he stretches the meaning of the paraphrase
beyond recognition to make it hypothetically compatible with the document; fi-
nally, even then, the procedure he describes is not in fact the same as the one in
the document.
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4. The document at Demosth, or. 24.20–3:
problems with individual features
I now turn to discussing Hansenʼs objections against the specific eight problems
that I identified with the wording of the document
1) I noted that „[t]he expression ‚after the herald has said the prayers‘
(ἐπειδὰν εὔξηται ὁ κῆρυξ) to indicate that a matter must be the first item on the
agenda of an Assembly meeting, just after the sacrifices, is unparalleled in
Athenian inscriptions“.87Hansenʼs counterargument does not disprove this basic
fact – he admits that this is the case, and that this expression is unparalleled in
inscriptions and in literary sources. He notes however that we never find any
reference at all in inscriptions to the ritual that initiated Assembly meetings, and
points to Aischin. Ctes. 1.23 as evidence that the prayers by the herald existed.
This is not, however, in doubt. The problem with the expression is that it is en-
tirely unparalleled. In my short discussion I pointed out that the customary ex-
pression, in Athens and elsewhere, for indicating the priority of an item in the
agenda of the Assembly was μɛτὰ τὰ ἱɛρά, which I translated as „after the sacri-
fices“, referring to Harris for this interpretation of τὰ ἱɛρά.88Hansen spendsmuch
of his discussion questioning Harrisʼ interpretation and reinstating the reading of
the expression as „after the sacred business“.89 But the expression is problematic
with either interpretation, and potentially more problematic with Hansenʼs. If
Harris is right about τὰ ἱɛρά, then we have in the document an unparalleled ex-
pression with a meaning that is consistently conveyed, with hundreds of
examples, in Greek inscriptions from across the Greek world by the formula μɛτὰ
τὰ ἱɛρά.90 If Hansen is right, then the document details a practice that has no
parallel anywhere in the Greek world: setting an item on the agenda before the
„sacred business“. Again and again, Greek decrees and laws give particular items
priority in the agendas of Assemblies from all over the Greek world, but never
once does this go as far as giving thempriority over sacred business, which comes
always, invariably, first. It is remarkable that evenwhen the Hellenistic kings and
the Romans, and matters pertaining to them, come into play, τὰ ἱɛρά still had
priority, and the expressions we find are μετὰ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ βασιλικά (e.g. IG XII 6
1, 18; 22; 24; 25; 30; 150) and μετὰ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ Ῥωμαίους (or similar: e. g. SEG
13.285; IG XII 8, 640). The evidence shows overwhelmingly that in the Assemblies
87 Canevaro 2013a, 152; 2013b, 97.
88 Harris 2006, 91–92.
89 Hansen 2016, 463–464.
90 See Canevaro 2013a, 152 n. 43; 2013b, 97 n. 55.
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of the Greek poleis the „sacred business“ came first, with no exception, and the
sheer size of the evidence strongly suggests that this was a basic principle by
which the Greeks always abided. Thus, if we were to accept Hansenʼs inter-
pretation of τὰ ἱɛρά, then the document would prescribe something entirely un-
heard of in Greek Assemblies: having an item in the agenda placed before the
„sacred business“. To sum up, whatever our reading of the meaning of τὰ ἱɛρά,
what the document states is entirely unparalleled (in the face of very abundant
relevant evidence) and unacceptable.
2) My second point dealt with the expression ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιειν͂ τῶν
νόμων.91 I noted that the verb in the document (in the active) has no subject, but
allowed that the subject may be understood, in which case the subject should be
the proedroi or the people. I pointed out however that if this is the case, then the
expression is entirely unparalleled in Classical sources, as all the evidence from
inscriptions shows that the verb used for the proedroi putting a matter to the vote
was ἐπιψηφίζɛιν and that the demos was always said to (ἐπι- or δια-)χɛιροτονεῖν
(or cognates). As for the literary evidence, „the verb used with χɛιροτονίαν (or
derivatives) is invariably δίδωμι“.92 My point therefore was that the expression
ἐπιχειροτονίαν ποιειν͂ is unparalleled to indicate both that the proedroi put
something to the vote, and that the demos votes on something. Bothmeanings are
consistently conveyed in Classical sources (literary and epigraphic) by other ex-
pressions.93 This is another suspicious feature of the document.
Hansenʼs response seems to misunderstand my argument. Most of his dis-
cussion on this point is concerned with showing that imperative/infinitives
without a subject are found in two Athenian laws (Rhodes-Osborne 25 l. 3; 26 ll.
6–7). But the problem of the expression that I highlight is not the absence of a
subject, but the fact that the expression is unparalleled with this meaning, and
that the relevant meaning is consistently conveyed in our contemporary sources
by other expressions. Hansen does not provide any counterarguments to this. His
final statement that „it is perfectly possible that Demosthenesʼ paraphrase of the
law on nomothesia is a reflection of the document inserted in the text“ is un-
warranted. On the one hand, when at Demosth. or. 24.25 we find the verb ποιɛιν͂,
its subject is the nomoi (as Hansen recognizes), not the demos or the proedroi as
91 Canevaro 2013a, 152; 2013b, 97.
92 I discuss the only two exceptions, Demosth. or. 24.25 (where the subject is the nomoi that ‚set‘
a διαχɛιροτονία as a procedural step of nomothesia) and Demosth. or. 21.6 (where ποιɛιν͂ with
καταχɛιροτονία indicates that the demos has made a condemnation of someone, and not simply
voted on a matter) at Canevaro 2013a, 152 and n. 45; 2013b, 97 and n. 57.
93 ποιɛιν͂with χɛιροτονία becomes common in much later Greek, which suggests that the docu-
ment is probably a text composed in the post-Classical period, see Canevaro 2013a, 152 and n. 45;
2013b, 97 and n. 57.
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understood in the document, and its object is διαχειροτονίαν, which in Hansenʼs
own reconstruction is not equivalent to the ἐπιχειροτονία, the first being read by
Hansen as one of the (double) votes on particular laws or sections of laws within
the wider procedure of ἐπιχειροτονία.94 On the other hand, when we find at De-
mosth. or. 24.26 τοὺς νόμους ἐπεχειροτονήσατε, with the Athenians (i. e. the
demos) as the subject, there is no ποιɛιν͂, and the expression with the verb
ἐπιχɛιροτονεῖν is, unlike that of the document, consistent with the use of (ἐπι- or
δια-)χɛιροτονεῖν (or cognates) in the inscriptional record. That the paraphrase by
Demosthenes is more consistent with epigraphic usage than the document is
evidence against the authenticity of the document.95
3) In my original analysis, I pointed out three difficulties in the sentence of
the document detailing the categories by which the laws are to be voted and re-
viewed, apart from the basic issue that the paraphrase mentions clearly one sin-
gle preliminary (double) vote, whereas the document has four96: πρῶτον μὲν πɛρὶ
τῶν βουλɛυτικῶν, δɛύτɛρον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν, ɛἶτα οἳ κɛιν͂ται τοις͂ ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν,
ɛἶτα τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν.97 The first problem is grammatical: because the expres-
sion that governs the period is ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν ποιɛιν͂ τῶν νόμων, if the categories
are to be for instance „the bouleutic laws“, „the laws of the Nine Archons“ and
„the laws of the othermagistrates“,98 thenwewould need, first, τῶν βουλɛυτικῶν
without πɛρὶ (for the adjective to qualify τῶν νόμων). Hansen „cannot find fault
with having an objective genitive (τῶν νόμων) specified by a prepositional group
where the genitive is governed by περί“.99 Yes, but if this is the case, then the
adjective βουλɛυτικῶν cannot qualify τῶν νόμων („the laws about the bouleutic
laws“ does not make any sense). So what does it qualify? τῶν βουλɛυτικῶνwhat?
It could be a generic „matters“ (understood), which would create a hopelessly
vague and undefined category, but the problem is compounded if we read, with
Hansen, περί also as the preposition governing τῶν κοινῶν („the laws about the
94 Hansen 2016, 451–458. At p. 451 n. 58, Hansen admits that διαχειροτονίαν and
ἐπεχειροτονήσατε are used synonymously at Demosth. or. 24.25 and 26 to indicate an individual
vote („a show of hands“), that is, what in inscriptions is referred to as a διαχειροτονία. But if
ἐπεχειροτονήσατε at Demosth. or. 24.26 is used as a reference to a simple διαχειροτονία, then we
are left with nomention at all in Demosthenesʼ discussion of the ἐπιχειροτονία as an overarching
procedure involving individual διαχειροτονίαι, capitatim, on various sections of the ‚code‘ of law
(see above pp. 85–89).
95 See above pp. 79–82 for epigraphic language and paraphrases.
96 On this see above pp. 89.
97 Canevaro 2013a, 153–154; 2013b, 98–99.
98 I leave aside τῶν κοινῶν – it is unclear what this refers to. The common laws? (What are
these?) The laws common to all magistrates, as suggested by MacDowell 1975, 66–67?
99 Hansen 2016, 464.
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common matters“?). And, in this case, what happens to the arrangement by
magistrate postulated by Hansen (see below) – this is not a category defined by
themagistrate in charge of the relevant laws. Even Hansen, moreover, is forced to
admit that τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν does not work: as it is, it must qualify
ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν, prescribing an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν that has nothing
to do with the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων. To work, it should be in the dative, to
match τοις͂ ἐννέα ἄρχουσιν governed by κɛιν͂ται.100
The second problem is that the next sentence, which lists the way in which
the votes are to be held, lists votes only on two categories, but fails to mention the
last two. Hansen hypothesizes that „[t]he person(s) who drew up the law found it
superfluous to repeat that for the two last categories“. This is guesswork, and one
would expect such a law to be precise (it is very precise elsewhere). In any case,
Hansenʼs hypothesis is not impossible, and could be an option if the document
proved otherwise unproblematic. But this is only one of several issues with the
document, many of them major problems.
The third problem is that the document describes the votes „kapitelweise“,
and then states that individual statutes have been rejected, but does not explain
when and how. Hansen discusses the procedure he envisions in a previous sec-
tion of his article, where he isolates two distinct kinds of ἐπιχειροτονία,101 and I
have shown at pp. 100–105 that there is no evidence for such a procedure, and no
parallels. Here I can only add that, in addition to the lack of evidence and pa-
rallels for this procedure, the second step that Hansen postulates is not actually
described in the document – where does this law describe and detail the second
vote on individual laws?
I also noted in my original analysis, and this is the most serious difficulty,
that if the laws of Athens were effectively categorised, conceptualised, and re-
viewed every year, in a very important procedure of ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν νόμων,
according to the categories cited in the document, then we should expect to find
these categories mentioned in the orators and in other sources as the organisa-
tional principle of the laws of the city. And yet none of these categories features
anywhere in our sources, and whenever we find a reference to the laws, these are
named, organised and identified otherwise. Hansen has no answer to the silence
of our sources about these categories. He rather takes issue with a contribution by
Harris that stresses that Athenian laws were grouped by substantive contents
rather than by procedural criteria.102 Hansen acknowledges that previous stud-
ies, including his own, have unduly underplayed the substantive features, but
100 Schöll 1886, 86 suggests to emend in τῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν.
101 Hansen 2016, 458–462.
102 Harris 2009/10; 2013. 138–174; Hansen 2016, 465–466.
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still holds that his interpretation that the Athenians „grouped their laws not by
types of action but by the competent magistrate“ is basically accurate, and that
this interpretation is upheld by the document.103
His argument is that „since each magistrate had, up to a point, a competence
determined on a material basis, the formal division of the laws did correspond
roughly with a material order; thus family and inheritance laws all came under
the archon, much of the law about religion came under the king archon, and the
polemarch must have had the whole law relating to metics and other non-Athe-
nians“.104 Hansen points to Hyp. Eux. 5–6 and Demosth. or. 35.37–8 as evidence
that the Athenians did group their laws according to the magistrate that brought
them to court. But he extrapolates too much from these passages when he talks
about „the formal division of the laws“. The first passage stresses that there are
separate individual laws about each and every offence, and shows that each law,
identified by its substantive contents and defining a particular offence, has a
particular magistrate in charge of upholding it. There is nothing here that should
lead us to speculate that the laws were formally grouped or conceptualised by
magistrate – it just states that each law indicated a magistrate in charge of
bringing the relevant cases to court. The second passage shows that magistrates
had competences and prerogatives over (roughly) discrete and substantively
defined groups of offences, but it does not say anywhere that the laws were
conceptualised, formally organised and grouped according to magistrate.105 It
shows that the Athenians conceptualised the competences of magistrates sub-
stantively, with reference to broad areas, but says nothing about formal divisions
of the laws, about their organisation, or about the fact that the laws were con-
ceptualised according to magistrate. Both passages discuss the particular
jurisdictions of officials but have nothing to say about the organisational princ-
iple of the laws.
Moreover, we should note that even the magistrates whose areas of compe-
tence are mentioned at Demosth. or. 35.37–8 (and whose competences are sub-
stantively defined and recognisable) are not equivalent to the categories men-
tioned in the document: Demosth. or. 35.37–8 mentions the specific areas of
competence of the Eleven, the Archon Eponymous, the Basileus and the Pole-
march – three out of four fall under one category of our document, the Nine Ar-
103 Hansen 1991, 165; 2016, 465 n. 105.
104 Hansen 1991, 165; 2016, 465 („The grouping of laws according to the magistrate responsible
for the matter in question is emphasised in two passages in forensic speeches“).
105 Cf. Harris 2013, 144: „The basic idea […] is that laws are grouped by substantive categories,
and actions are assigned to magistrates on the basis of their jurisdiction over certain areas de-
fined in substantive terms.“
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chons, and there is no room in the procedure described in the document for finer
divisions, as the votes by macro-categories seem to be followed by votes on in-
dividual laws, not by further votes by specific magistrate. There is no substantive
coherencewhatsoever in the competences of the Nine Archons overall, or in those
of all the other magistrates overall – the criterion of organisation in the document
is purely procedural, which clashes with the overwhelming evidence that Athe-
nian laws were understood and conceptualised by their substantive contents.
The same is true of τῶν βουλɛυτικῶν: the Athenian Council had competence
over a variety of areas,106 and its powers often overlapped with those of other
magistrates in the enforcement of the relevant laws (Aristot. Ath. pol. 47.1). For
instance, cases of eisangelia could start in the Council (Aristot. Ath. pol. 45.4),
which could impose fines up to 500 drachmas, but over that level of penalty, the
case was transferred to a lawcourt by the thesmothetai (Aristot. Ath. pol. 59.4). So
how were the laws on eisangelia categorised? As part τῶν βουλɛυτικῶν or as part
of those of the Nine Archons? The Council had also wide powers on naval ad-
ministration and shipbuilding (Aristot. Ath. pol. 46; Demosth. or. 22.8). According
to the law of Periander which reformed the trierarchy, trierarchs could receive
naval equipment from the incumbent trierarchs, but the Council had to enact a
decree assigning each incumbent to his successor. In Demosth. or. 47 the speaker
had to collect his equipment from Theophemus who refused to hand it over
(47.20). The speaker officially complained with the Dispatchers and the epime-
letai ton neorionwhowere in charge of bringing the case to court, which convicted
Theophemus (47.26). Because Theophemus did not hand the equipment over,
despite the lawcourtʼs decision, the speaker complained again to the Dispatchers
and the Council which enacted a decree authorizing the trierarch himself to col-
lect the equipment from Theophemusʼs house.107 This episode shows that the
enforcement of many laws was carried out through the interplay between the
Council and other officials: the epimeletai, the Dispatchers and the trierarchs. The
Council plays here a central role in the procedure, but the relevant laws are im-
possible to categorise, according to the criteria postulated by Hansen, by the area
of competence of particular magistrates. And, likewise, the Council was involved
in religious matters together with the Basileus and several other officials – laws
concernedwith sacredmatters did not squarely fall under the competences of one
specific magistrate, but involved several, across the categories listed in the doc-
ument. The decree for the Sacred Orgas (IG II3 1 292),108 for instance, reports at l.
18 that a law provided the framework within which the land division prescribed
106 Rhodes 1972, 88–143; Rhodes 1981, 559–564.
107 See Harris 2013, 41.
108 On which see now Lambert 2012, 60–65.
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by the decree took place. The law envisaged the supervision of the sacred pre-
cincts by a series of officials and public institutions: the Basileus, the Areopagus,
the demarchs, the general for the protection of country, the peripolarchoi and the
Council. Once again, how could a law like this be categorised under the categories
listed in the document? The law on the dokimastai of silver coinage (Rhodes-Os-
borne 25=SEG 26.72) presents similar problems: most of the provisions define the
duties of the dokimastai in policing silver coinage, but at ll. 13–16 the law states
that if they fail to perform their duties according the law, the συλλογῆς of the
demosmust inflict on them fifty lashes of the whip. Denunciations must bemade,
for matters in the grainmarket, to the sitophylakes, for matters in the agora, to the
syllogeis, and for matters in the market of the Peireus, to the epimeletai of the
market (ll. 18–22). If these magistrates want to inflict penalties beyond 10
drachmas, then the matter need to be referred to a court, and therefore handed
over to the thesmothetai (ll. 23–28). If any of these magistrates does not act in
accordance with the law, he must be reported to the Council (ll. 33–5). A law such
as this falls under the jurisdiction of several magistrates, falling under more than
one of the categories as described in the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3, and it
is therefore impossible to categorize according to the categories of the document.
Likewise, Agyrriusʼ Grain Tax Law (Rhodes-Osborne 26=SEG 48.96) prescribes
duties for the Council, the Assembly and for ten officials elected by the Assembly
to handle the grain from Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. Once again, it is impossible
to categorize such a law according to the categories mentioned in the document.
The provisions in the document are incompatible with the evidence of actual
Athenian laws.
My point stands: the document purports to describe a very prominent annual
procedure of review of the laws, andwe should expect the categories bywhich the
review is held to be a recognisable reference point in the orators. Instead, they are
never mentioned in our sources, and no laws are ever described as part of any
such category.109 These categories, in fact, fail to accommodate a high number of
laws with very clear substantive scopes but involving the action of several
different magistrates.
109 Hansen 2016, 466 mentions also the organisation of the second part of the Ath. pol. as
evidence for the groupings mentioned in the document (cf. Hansen 1974, 10–12). But this text
goes through the institutions of Athens, not through the laws of the city. It does so according to
widespread ideas about the parts of the politeia (see Harris 2006, 30–32, and Canevaro 2014, 279–
283 on Aristotleʼs division of the parts of the politeia in the Politics). The text is hardly evidence
that the Athenians formally divided their laws in the groups listed in the document. In fact, the
categories in the document are not even equivalent to those in the Ath. pol.: the Council gets its
own category in both (in the Ath. pol. this category also includes the Assembly), but it is unclear
what the equivalent of τῶν κοινῶν of the document is; the document divides the magistrates in
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4) I noted in my analysis that the clause τὴν δʼ ἐπιχɛιροτονίαν ɛἶναι τῶν
νόμων κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κɛιμένους is otiose, as the procedure created by the
document is supposed to be a new one, and therefore there are no relevant
existing laws outside of the document to be followed.110 Hansen counters that
these existing laws to which the document refers may be general rules about
voting in the Assembly, rules such as those about the tasks of proedroi and pry-
taneis that are not repeated in the law on nomothesia. We have hundreds of de-
crees and laws from Classical Athens, and many of them deal with votes in the
Assembly and in the Council, which are to be held according to the normal rules.
They never specify all the details of the procedures for voting, and yet they never
feel the need to refer to the relevant laws on the topic. That the voting must be
held according to the existing laws on the subject is simply understood, and there
is never any need to point out that the existing laws apply. The so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων is not described in the document as particularly dis-
tinctive when it comes to voting procedures (it is simply a series of
διαχειροτονίαι), so there is no special reason in this instance for which it should
be necessary to specify that the voting must happen according to the normal
laws – how else? We find the same expression in the document at Demosth. or.
24.39–40, reporting the law of Timocrates (τὰς πράξεις εἶναι τῇ πόλει κατὰ τοὺς
νόμους τοὺς κειμένους), and the expression is confirmed as part of this document
at Demosth or. 24.100.111 In that case, however, the use of the expression is not
otiose at all, but makes perfect sense: the law modifies the existing rules con-
cerning the punishment (and specifically the imprisonment) of those that owe
debts to the public treasury, but towards the end it makes an exception for those
who have purchased the right to collect taxes and their sureties, to whom the new
rules do not apply. Accordingly, it singles out the relevant category and states
that, for this category only, the existing laws must apply, and not the new law.
Conversely, in the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3 the law does not make any
modification to the normal voting procedures of the Assembly, which continue to
apply to all votes held in the Assembly as they always have, and there is no need
(and no parallel) for the expression in such a context – it is redundant. It is in fact
possible and likely that the source of the expression, for whoever composed the
the Nine Archons and all others; and the Ath. pol.has one separate category for the lawcourts. All
there is here is a vague similarity in the focus on magistrates and bodies, except that this is fully
justified in the Ath. pol. as this is a description of a politeia, not a list of groupings of laws.
110 Canevaro 2013a, 154; 2013b, 99.
111 This is a stichometric document that my analysis shows to be reliable, see Canevaro 2013b,
113–121.
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document, was the stichometric document at Demosth. or. 24.39–40, or the pa-
raphrase at Demosth. or. 24.100.
5) The next point of disagreement between Hansen and myself is about the
expression τὴν τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν – whether it is compatible with
the corresponding expression in the paraphrase at Demosth. or. 24.25 (τὴν τρίτην
ἀπέδειξαν [οἱ νόμοι] ἐκκλησίαν) and with the statement of Aristot. Ath. pol. 43.3
that οἱ δὲ πρυτανɛύοντɛς […] συνάγουσιν […] τὸν δὲ δῆμον τɛτράκις τῆς
πρυτανɛίας ἑκάστης.112
I shall start from the aspects on which Hansen and I agree. First, we both
agree that the most obvious interpretation of τὴν τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν
ἐκκλησιῶν in the document is as a reference to the third Assembly meeting of a
discrete group of three, held in one prytany („the last of the three ekklesiai held
during the first prytany“).113 This implies that there were three Assembly meet-
ings per prytany. We also agree that this is irreconcilable with the information
provided at Aristot. Ath. pol. 43.3 that there were four Assembly meetings per
prytany, a piece of information that is confirmed by Demosth. or. 18 and 19 and
Aischin. 2 and 3, which document all the Assembly meetings held in the eighth
prytany of 347/6, which were undoubtedly four.114 This is a problem that Hansen
acknowledges, but tries to solve (in line with a series of discussions that he has
published over many years) by postulating an evolution in the number of As-
sembly meetings which were three per prytany at the time of the speech (and,
presumably, when the law on the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων was en-
acted), and became four at a later date.115 Like most historians, I find Hansenʼs
arguments for such a change in the number of Assembly meetings per prytany
unconvincing.116 This is not the place to rehearse the terms of this debate, which
are in any case laid out extensively in a long series of publications. It is enough to
note that if one believes, with most historians, that the Assembly meetings were
four per prytany, then the document is inconsistent with external information. It
is also worth remarking that, ultimately, the wording of the document is the only
112 Canevaro 2013a, 154–155; 2013b, 99–100; Hansen 2016, 470.
113 Hansen 2016, 467. After stating this in clear terms, Hansen, in the context of a particular
counter-argument at p. 468, tries to argue that another meaning is also possible. But this is not
how he himself reads the expression at p. 467 and elsewhere.
114 Hansen 2016, 469 recognises this.
115 Hansen – Mitchel 1984; Hansen 1987; 1993.
116 Hansen 2016, 469 admits that most historians disagree with him on this point. See in partic-
ular Harris 2006, 81–120, which republishes his refutations of Hansenʼs arguments with adden-
da, and e. g. Lewis 1997, 15 n. 24; Rhodes – Osborne 2003, 323; Stockton 1990, 71; Pritchett 2001,
192–201; Gauthier 1987, 314; Errington 1994, 137 n. 6; MacDowell 2000, 266–267 and the refer-
ences in Rhodes 1981, 521.
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reason for which one may want to challenge the validity of the evidence of the
Ath. pol. for the earlier period – there is no other evidence that points to such a
change in the number of Assemblies as that postulated by Hansen. Once again,
the reconstruction that Hansen uses to argue that the document is not incom-
patiblewith external information depends ultimately on the document alone, and
his argument is circular.
Apart from this fundamental problem, and this fundamental disagreement,
Hansen formulates several questionable arguments to prove that the document is
not inconsistent with its paraphrase. In my original discussion, I noted that while
the document talks about the last of the three Assembly meetings of the first
pritany, and therefore about the second meeting after the meeting at which the
so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων took place, the paraphrase at Demosth. or.
24.25 talks about the τὴν τρίτην […] ἐκκλησίαν, which should be read as the third
Assembly meeting after the initial one. I supported the identification of this
contradiction by pointing out that in inscriptions εἰς τὴν πρῶτην ἐκκλησίαν
means unequivocally „at the next Assembly meeting“, and therefore τὴν τρίτην
ἐκκλησίανmust mean the third meeting after the current one. I then pointed out
that this reading is confirmed by Demosth. or. 20.94, which states that the bills
have to be read πολλάκις in the Assembly, which cannot indicate once or twice,
but at least three times; I added that Dein. 1.42 states that the bill of the trierarchic
law was read καϑʼ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, and not καϑʼ ἑκατέραν ἐκκλησίαν, another
clear indication that it cannot be two meetings after the initial vote, but three.117
117 Hansenʼs attempt to explain away this further evidence (Hansen 2016, 468) is inconclusive.
In an attempt to cover both scenarios (with the document being authentic and inauthentic), he
states: „Nomatter whether it is the third or the fourth ekklesia of the year in which nomothesia is
once more on the agenda of the Assembly, it is in any case the last held in the first prytany.“ But
this statement is incorrect: it is only the document that states that this string of Assembly meet-
ings is set in the first prytany, whereas nowhere in the paraphrase we find an indication that the
procedure was confined to a particular time of the year – as far as the paraphrase is concerned, as
I have shown above (pp. 91–100), the initial διαχειροτονία could happen at any point of the year,
and the appointment of the nomothetai had to be discussed at the third Assembly after that.
While giving the impression that his argument in support of the document here is independent
of presuppositions founded on the document itself, Hansen in fact relies uncritically on it for a
key feature of the procedure. He then notes that the actual session of the nomothetai must take
place after the Assembly meeting at which the appointment of the nomothetai is decided, and
therefore the πολλάκις of Demosth. or. 20.94 must not necessarily be limited to the period
between the two Assembly meetings. But πολλάκις is used of the readings of law proposals by
the secretary in the Assembly in the context of a paraphrase that follows directly the citation of
the law on nomothesia. These readings of the new bills in the Assembly are mentioned contex-
tually with the requirement that law proposals should be posted before the Eponymous Heroes,
114 Mirko Canevaro
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Hansen states that my reading of τὴν τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν would make sense
only if the expression was τὴν τρίτην ἀπέδειξαν ἐκκλησίαν μετʼ ἐκείνην or ἀπʼ
ἐκείνης, but fails to recognize that e. g. in IG II2 103 l. 14 εἰς τὴν πρώτην ἐκκλησίαν
does not require any further specification. I add here another argument that
shows that, in the context of Demosth. or. 24.25, my reading of τὴν τρίτην
ἐκκλησίαν is the only possible one. As I noted above (pp. 86–88, 104–105), the
paraphrase of Demosth. or. 24.25 provides a very clear and tight temporal arti-
culation of the nomothesia procedure. The priority of the initial διαχειροτονία
held in the initial Assembly meeting is strongly marked by πρῶτον μὲν. The next
steps are then introduced by μετὰ ταῦτα δέ, which marks the fact that everything
else happens after this initial διαχειροτονία. The sentence introduced by μετὰ
ταῦτα δέ stresses that the next steps cannot take place immediately after the δι-
αχειροτονία, that is in the same Assembly, but that the law indicates clearly that
the appointment of the nomothetai can be discussed only τὴν τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν.
τὴν τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν is qualified therefore by μετὰ ταῦτα δέ, which makes it
impossible that it may be understood inclusively – it must be the third Assembly
μετὰ ταῦτα, that is the third Assembly meeting after the initial one at which the
διαχειροτονία takes place.
Hansen accepts „for the sake of argument“ that Demosthenes may be refer-
ring at Demosth. or. 24.25 to the third Assembly meeting after the initial one, but
even in that case he claims that we can eliminate the contradiction with the
document by assuming that also τὴν τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν in the
document means „the last of the three following ekklesiai“.118 But while the rea-
ding of τὴν τρίτην ἐκκλησίαν as the third ekklesia following the initial one is
possible grammatically (cf. IG II2 103 l. 14) and is supported by the context of the
reference (cf. μετὰ ταῦτα δέ), there is no reason whatsoever to interpret τὴν
τελευταίαν τῶν τριῶν ἐκκλησιῶν in this sense. The expression clearly identifies a
discrete unit of three Assembly meetings to be held in a given prytany (the first)
and marks the third of the three as the relevant one, while the so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων takes place in the first one of the prytany. If the three
following Assembly meetings straddled two prytanies, why would they be indi-
cated, with the article, as a discrete and recognisable unit (τῶν τριῶν
ἐκκλησιῶν)? The two expressions are contradictory.
as part of the same provision of the law, and we know fromDemosth. or. 24.25 that this provision
applied to the period between the two Assembly meetings (ἐν δὲ τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ τούτῳ), and
not beyond.
118 Cf. Hansen 2016, 467, where he is adamant instead that the expression in the documentmust
refer to the last of the three ekklesiai held during the first prytany.
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6) In my analysis I note that the document uses the bouleutic calendar at the
beginning but the festival calendar at the end, and the festival calendar is never
found inAttic decrees and laws of the late-fifth and fourth century before 341/0.119
This, I concluded, is strong evidence against the authenticity of the document.
Hansen admits that the festival calendar is in effect never found before 341/0, but
attempts to justify its use here by pointing out, first, that in neither occurrence it is
used in the document to date the actual law, as in a prescript. He brings a decree
of the Council proposed by Demosthenes, discussed in Aischin. 2.61, as evidence
that the festival calendar could be used within the body of a decree, and muses
that the first date may have been indicated according to the bouleutic calendar
because it is closer to the prescript, and so it „repeats the official date“, whereas
the date at the end, according to the festival calendar, was allegedly used to stress
the coincidence between the two calendars.120
Hansenʼs attempt to justify the use of the festival calendar in the face of
overwhelming evidence that it was never used in laws and decrees before the
340s is unsatisfactory. First of all, the distinction between usage in the prescript
and usage in the body of the law or decree is unwarranted by the evidence –
Hansen is unable to find one single instance of the festival calendar used any-
where (not just in the prescript) in laws and decrees of the late-fifth and fourth
century BCE before the 340s. To make up for this, he refers to Aischin. 2.61, where
Aeschines paraphrases a decree proposed by Demosthenes in 347/6 calling for
twomeetings of the Assembly on the 18th and on the 19th of Elaphebolion.121 First,
this is a paraphrase, not an actual decree. Hansen himself stated in an article of
1993 that „[t]he festival calendar was the one with which every citizen was fam-
iliar, whereas the bouleutic calendar was an innovation […] used exclusively for
the running of the boule and the ekklesia. Thus whereas everyone would have an
idea of when it was the 16th of Pyanopsion, nobody (except the prytaneis them-
selves) would offhand recognize the 33rd day of the 3rd prytany.“122 It would not
be surprising if Aeschines had paraphrased the dates indicated in the decree ac-
cording to the bouleutic calendar by translating them into the more familiar fes-
tival calendar, because the point of Aeschinesʼ argument here depends specifi-
cally on the precise dates of themeetings being ascertained and recognizable. The
use of the festival calendar in a paraphrase is not evidence that the festival cal-
endar was used in the decree itself. But, second andmore importantly, even if this
decree actually used the festival calendar, this is not evidence of a difference in
119 Canevaro 2013a. 155; 2013b, 101.
120 Hansen 2016, 470–471.
121 On these events see Harris 1995, 70–77.
122 Hansen 1993, 109.
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usage between prescripts and the body of the decrees. It must be stressed that this
is a decree of 347/6, only six years earlier than the first attestation of the double
dating, according to both calendars, in the prescript of an inscription. In fact,
Aischin. 2.91–2 has a decree of the Council also of 347/6 read out for the very
purpose of ascertaining its date, as indicated in the prescript – this date seems to
have been indicated in the prescript as the third day of Munichion. This decree,
that is, seems to be an early instance of the phenomenon that we see in inscrip-
tions more commonly from 341/0.123 If the decree of Demosthenes is indeed evi-
dence of the use of the festival calendar in the body of a decree, this, far from
proving that there was a difference in usage between the prescripts and the body
of the decrees, shows instead thatwhen the festival calendar started being used in
the prescripts (in the 340s, as Aischin. 2.91–2 shows), it also started appearing in
the body of the decrees. There is no misalignment in the usage between the
prescripts and the rest of the decrees, and the example brought by Hansen, far
from proving his point, is evidence that the usage was consistent in all sections of
decrees and laws.
The law on nomothesia which the document purports to represent was not
enacted in the 340s, in the 350s or in the 360s. It was enacted in the late-fifth or
very early-fourth century BCE, decades before dates expressed according to the
festival calendar started appearing in decrees. Hansen also observes that the
dates in the document are not part of the prescript – they do not date the meeting
at which the law on nomothesia was enacted. He argues that the prescript of the
law (omitted in the document) would have contained a date expressed according
to the bouleutic calendar, as was the norm. The implication of this argument is
that the less well-known bouleutic calendar was used specifically to refer to
meetings of the Council, of the Assembly (and, later, of the nomothetai) –Hansen
has argued forcefully in the past, in an article called „Was the Athenian Ekklesia
Convened According to the Festival Calendar or the Bouleutic Calendar?“, that
the Assembly was summoned according to the bouleutic calendar.124 But the two
dates that we find in the document, although they are not dates in the prescript,
are not random dates either – they are specifically dates marking a particular
Assembly meeting, on the 11th day of the first prytany. At Demosth. or. 24.20 the
date according to the bouleutic calendar marks the Assembly meeting at which
the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμωνwas meant to be held, and at Demosth. or.
24.23 the date expressed according to the festival calendar marks the same As-
123 Hansen 1993, 101–102.
124 Hansen 1993, 101–103. See alsoHarris 2006, 118–119, accused byHansen of denying this, but
who in fact agrees, and simply points out that in doing that the prytaneis had to keep an eye also
on the festival calendar to avoid summoning the Assembly on festival days.
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sembly meeting, at which the demos (that is, the Assembly) is meant to elect
public advocates of the laws. These two dates are therefore not random dates, but
mark a specific Assembly meeting, and Assembly meetings, as shown by all the
evidence for this period and argued by Hansen himself, were always summoned
and dated according to the bouleutic calendar. These dates are exactly the kind of
dates we should expect, at this time, to find expressed according to the bouleutic
calendar, and the use of the festival calendar at the end of the document is in-
congruous, unjustified and inconsistent with all the evidence. Hansenʼs attempt
to justify this feature is special pleading.125
7) I noted in my analysis that if, in accordance with Demosthenesʼ para-
phrase, proposals for laws are posted after the initial Assembly meeting at which
the Athenians vote on whether new proposals should be made, then there is no
way for the Athenians to know at the initial meeting what contradictory laws will
be challenged, and therefore to appoint qualified advocates to defend them, as
the document prescribes. The provision of the document that five citizens should
be elected on the 11th of Hekatombaion to defend the laws that are challenged is
therefore nonsensical.126 Hansen counters that the provision makes sense if we
imagine an ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων in two stages (in accordance with Hansenʼs
interpretation of the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν ἀρχῶν) with a second stage at which
particular laws are rejected by the demos– in that case the Athenianswould know
what laws need to be defended, and therefore would be able to appoint qualified
advocates. I have shown above (pp. 100–105) that there is no evidence whatsoe-
ver (outside the document) for Hansenʼs interpretation of the so-called
ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων as a procedure in two stages, that there is no actual
parallel for such a procedure (the ἐπιχειροτονία τῶν ἀρχῶν does not provide a
parallel), and that this reconstruction is irreconcilable with the information pro-
vided by Demosthenes in this speech and in Demosth. or. 20.127 This provision is
incompatible with the nomothesia procedure as can be reconstructed from De-
mosthenesʼ paraphrase and from other sources – it is further evidence that the
125 Hansen 2016, 471 hypothesises that the bouleutic calendar may have been used at the be-
ginning of the document because of the vicinity of the prescript – it „repeats the official date“. In
fact, it does not repeat the same official date, unless, that is, we assume (for no reason whatso-
ever) that the law on nomothesiawas also passed on the 11th of the first prytany. It is also unclear
to me how referring to the same Assembly meeting, at the opposite ends of a very long law, once
according to one calendar, and once according to another, with no actual explicit indication that
the dates are the same, would stress the identity of the calendars – if stressing the identity of the
calendars had been the purpose (and it is unclear why it would be in this instance), thenwhoever
drafted the law could have simply expressed both dates according to both calendars.
126 Canevaro 2013a, 155–156; 2013b, 101.
127 On Demosth. or. 20 see Canevaro 2016a.
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law that Demosthenes paraphrases cannot be the text that we find in the docu-
ment.
8) I noted in my analysis that Demosthenes, in his discussions and para-
phrases, always uses the technical terms syndikoi and (less often) synegoroi to
refer to the elected advocates of the laws to be repealed contextually with the
enactment of new laws (Demosth. or. 24.36; 20.146). These terms are also those
always used for public advocates, in inscriptions and literary sources alike.128 The
document on the other hand uses the participle συναπολογησομένους, which is
unattested in inscriptions (as are all other forms of the verb συναπολογέομαι), as
if it were a technical term – as a synonym of syndikoi or synegoroi.129 Hansen
counters that although συναπολογέομαι is unattested in inscriptions, it is attested
six times (in addition to the instance in the document) in fourth-century Athenian
forensic speeches (Demosth. or. 24.157; 159; 25.56; Hyp. Lyk. 10; fr. 3 ll.15–16; Lyc.
1.138) and claims that it is also a technical term, a synonym of syndikos and sy-
negoros.130
First of all, as I observed in my methodological remarks, the usage of the
orators is a very flimsy basis on which to reconstruct documentary language,
because it is clear that the orators apply much variation in their discussions and
paraphrases, and can recur to periphrases that would never be used in a law or a
decree (see above p. 82). When we find in a document an expression or a formula
that is never found in inscriptions with thatmeaning, andwe see that inscriptions
consistently use another expression or formula for conveying that samemeaning,
that casts doubts on the authenticity of the document.
Second, Hansenʼs passages do not provide real parallels. In all these in-
stances, the verb is used to indicate the actions and interventions of a supporting
speaker that contributes to oneʼs defence, not to indicate directly the supporting
speaker or the public advocate, which are always referred to with the technical
terms syndikoi or synegoroi. Although the verb belongs to the same semantic field,
it is not a synonym of syndikos or synegoros, interchangeable with them in doc-
umentary language – it is never used like that. At Demosth. or. 24.157; 159; Hyp.
Lyk. fr. 3 ll. 15–16 the verb is used to indicate the actions of various politicians, of
Timocrates and Androtion, and of volunteers that decide to assist a defendant. It
is not used in the participle, it qualifies other terms, and it is not a synonym of the
technical terms syndikos and synegoros. In the only three instances in which the
128 See Rubinstein 2000, 43–45 for this terminology.
129 Canevaro 2013a, 156; 2013b, 101–102.
130 Hansen 2016, 472–473. He also mentions three instances in later sources (Dion. Hal. ant.
7.54.3; Lib. decl. 49.1.5, Lib. progymn. 13.1.18) and two in scholia to Demosth. or. 24, but these
passages are irrelevant, as they aremuch later and are not evidence for Classical Athenian usage.
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verb is used in the participle it is not a synonym of syndikos or synegoros either. At
Hyp. Lyk. 10, the participle συναπολογησομένων is used together with τῶν
ἀναβαινόντων ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ in what is clearly a periphrasis to indicate a synegoros,
so it is not a technical term synonymous with synegoros.131 At Demosth. or. 25.55
the expression ὁ νῦν συναπολογησόμενος (with the participle) is not simply used
to indicate the status of synegoros, but qualifies ironically the brother of Aristo-
geiton (ὁ χρηστὸς ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσί) by stressing the contrast between his previous
actions (he brought once an indictment against Aristogeiton) and the current
actions (speaking in support of Aristogeiton). The construction stresses with the
participle that the focus is on the actions of the brother, not on his formal status.
Likewise, the expression μισϑοῦ δὲ συναπολογουμένοις ἀεὶ τοῖς κρινομένοις at
Lyc. 1.138 does not use the participle συναπολογουμένοις simply to indicate sy-
negoroi or syndikoi, but rather describes the action of speaking in support of a
defendant for money. Again, it is not an example of the participle of this verb
used, technically, as a synonym of synegoros or syndikos, but is rather a verb that
strongly stresses the actions of such figures and their motivations. In all these
instances, moreover, the verb is always used to indicate the activity of a co-
pleader who speaks in support of a defendant in a trial, and never to indicate the
activity of an elected public advocate, either of the polis or of an association. The
verb, that is, is never used in our sourceswith themeaning found in the document
(the meaning more usually conveyed by the term syndikos or the verb
συνδικεῖν).132
We know what the two technical terms were that could be used in Attic
documentary language to indicate a publicly appointed advocate: syndikos and,
less frequently, synegoros. The term syndikos is in fact used several times in
Demosth. or. 20 as a technical term to refer to the advocates of the law of Leptines.
These are the terms that we find, invariably, in inscriptions and literary sources,
and these are the terms we should expect to find in a law. The document uses
instead a periphrasis constructed with the participle of συναπολογέομαι, a verb
that is used twice in this very speech of the activities of synegoroi (co-pleaders for
the defendant), and in a handful of other instances elsewhere in the orators. The
occurrences of this verb (in the participle or not) do not support the claim that its
131 It is unclear to me why, according to Hansen 2016, 472, the instances in Hyp. Lyk. would be
particularly strong indication that the verb is a technical term like synegoros, and synonymous of
synegoros. And at fr. 3 ll. 15–16 the verb is not used in the participle, and therefore it cannot
demonstrate that „[t]he participle is used synonymously with synegoros about advocates spea-
king for the defendant“.
132 On the figure of the public advocate and the terminology used to indicate him see Rubinstein
2000, 43–44.
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participle was used, in documentary language, as a technical term synonymously
with syndikos to indicate a public advocate. This periphrasis is out of place in a
law, and together with several other issues and problematic features, contributes
to the overall case against the authenticity of the document.
5. Conclusion
Hansenʼs challenge to my analysis has allowed me to clarify some of the key
tenets ofmymethodology, aswell as to analysemore in depth the evidence for the
nomothesia procedure found in particular in Demosth. or. 24, as well as the pro-
cedure, the structure and the language of the document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3.
In this article I have shown that any attempt to read Demosthenesʼ paraphrase of
the relevant law in a way that is consistent with the procedure described in the
document leads, in some cases, to uneconomical and improbable readings that
stretch the meaning of the text beyond recognition; in other cases, to readings
that are quite simply impossible and contradicted by the text and by other evi-
dence. There are fundamental and undeniable contradictions between the doc-
ument and the evidence of the speech and of other sources, which show that the
document cannot be the law on nomothesia quoted and discussed in the speech.
This is reinforced by several problematic features in the document itself, which
contradicts external evidence at several places and shows language and ex-
pressions incompatible with Athenian documentary language. These are decisive
reasons to deem this document non-authentic – a later forgery.
This has important consequences for the reconstruction of Athenian nomo-
thesia: Hansenʼs interpretation, presented first in Hansen (1985) and reiterated in
Hansen (2016), takes the document as its starting point and has as its main pur-
pose to accommodate the procedure described in the document, but is un-
economical and problematic when it attempts to explain the evidence of the
paraphrase in Demosth. or. 24, the external evidence of Demosth. or. 20 and of
other passages in the orators, and the evidence of inscriptions. The reading of the
nomothesia procedures that I offered in Canevaro (2013a) remains the most eco-
nomical interpretation of the procedure, and the most adherent to what the re-
levant sources actually say, free from prejudices derived from the document that
have for too long hampered our understanding of nomothesia.
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